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Chapter 1 – Introduction 
Equity analysts play a crucial role in financial markets. Stocks covered by analysts account 
for more than 95% of U.S. market capitalization (Barber et al. (2001)). Initiation of analyst 
coverage leads to a boost in stock price of about 5% (Demiroglu and Ryngaert (2010)). 
Furthermore, investors rely on equity analysts to make investment decisions. The issuance of 
“Buy” or “Sell” recommendations is associated with a significant stock price reaction in the 
direction of the recommendation (Womack (1996)). Equity analysts are frequently featured in 
media outlets such as The Wall Street Journal, which also conducts a yearly survey for the 
“Best on the Street” analyst. However, since the late 1990s the relevance of analysts has been 
controversially discussed with a particular focus on analyst conflict of interests (SEC (2002)). 
Several regulations have been passed since then to mitigate such conflicts. 
Security prices of covered firms cannot fully reflect all available information, because if they 
would, those who commit resources to obtain information would not be compensated. An 
“equilibrium degree of disequilibrium” is the necessary condition for efficient markets 
(Grossman and Stiglitz (1980)). Against this backdrop, the relevance of equity analyst in 
financial markets becomes apparent. Analysts are incented to facilitate profit opportunities 
for investors by discovering private information. Moreover, their rationale to exist depends 
on the issuance of research reports that are considered relevant by investors. It is therefore a 
fruitful research opportunity to explore the information content of analyst outputs, i.e., stock 
recommendations and earnings forecasts, in greater detail. 
This thesis covers three broad research questions: The first paper (chapter 2) “The Good, The 
Bad, and The Lucky: Projected Earnings Accuracy and Profitability of Stock 
Recommendations” explores cross-sectional differences among analysts regarding the 
accuracy of their earnings forecasts and the investment value of their stock recommendations. 
It focuses on the question whether some analysts add more value in the investment decision 
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process than others and how these analysts can be identified. The second paper (chapter 3) 
“Sell Side Recommendations during Booms and Busts” switches the focus from the cross-
section to the time series. It examines the profitability of analyst stock recommendations 
across the business cycle. In particular, it studies how the information content of stock 
recommendations as well as the initial investor reaction depend on the business cycle. The 
third paper (chapter 4) “Do Aggregate Company Outlooks have Macroeconomic Content?” 
addresses the question whether aggregated analyst forecasts have predictive power for overall 
economic developments. The major difference to the previous two chapters is that analyst 
outputs are studied on an aggregated basis to analyze their macroeconomic content. A new 
application of analyst recommendations is proposed which mimics a survey among analysts 
about the overall future development of all companies covered by them. 
Chapter 2 explores ability differences among equity analysts. Loh and Mian (2006) show that 
more accurate analyst earnings forecasts lead to superior firm valuations and in turn to more 
profitable stock recommendations. Their study is based on a one-dimensional sorting of 
analysts in terms of their ex post realized earnings accuracy, i.e., they examine the 
contemporaneous relationship between earnings accuracy and recommendation profitability. 
Analyst skill variables that have been used for in-sample analyses of earnings accuracy such 
as the experience of the analyst (e.g., Hilary and Hsu (2013)) are neglected. We argue that 
this approach cannot differentiate between skill and luck. Some earnings forecasts might 
simply be more accurate because of randomness. For example, an analyst who is always 
overly pessimistic will be relatively more accurate when a recession strikes. Following this 
analyst’s recommendations is probably not a good advice, since the demonstrated higher 
accuracy is based on luck and not on skill. The distinction between luck and skill is very 
important as earlier studies show that there is little persistency in ex-post rankings of analysts 
both regarding their earnings accuracy as well as their recommendation profitability. For 
example, Hall and Tacon (2010) demonstrate that last year’s rank tables of earnings accuracy 
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or recommendation profitability do not predict recommendation profitability in the next 
period.  
Our study makes several contributions to the literature. First, we develop a new framework 
which allows to distinguish between able and lucky analysts, i.e., whether an analyst 
produces superior outputs due to skill or due to luck, by combining the input–output analysis 
of Loh and Mian (2006) with the forecast accuracy literature (e.g., Bae, Stulz, and Tan 
(2008)). In contrast to Loh and Mian (2006), our framework is based on ex ante available 
information and in is implementable from an investor’s perspective. We project out-of-
sample analyst earnings accuracy to ex ante identify analysts who produce superior earnings 
estimates, i.e., analysts with superior knowledge of fundamentals. We find that the distinction 
between able and lucky analysts is essential. In addition to analyst past performance, 
investors must take into account analyst skill measures, i.e., look beyond the track record. 
The track record of an analyst is not sufficient to determine whether an analyst will issue 
profitable stock recommendations and accurate earnings forecasts in the future. Only able 
analysts with superior skill measures and a good track record also have high projected 
earnings accuracy that translates into higher future recommendation profitability. In contrast, 
recommendations of lucky analysts with a good track record but low skill measures do not 
have any investment value. These results also explain why the trading strategy suggested by 
Hall and Tacon (2010) is not profitable since it is based on analyst track records only. Our 
analysis indicates that the challenging task for investors is to identify and disregard the 
investment advice of lucky analysts, i.e., analysts that seem to be able just because they 
delivered a good result last year while in fact they are not. 
Second, we find a pronounced heterogeneity among analysts in terms of their 
recommendation performance and earnings accuracy. Only some analysts add value in the 
investment decision process. There is a strong difference between able analysts who produce 
substantial investment value and their unable counterparts whose recommendations actually 
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do not add any value. Our study differs fundamentally to previous studies which identify a 
link between individual analyst ability measures such as experience and the market impact in 
an event-study setting (e.g., Sorescu and Subrahmanyam (2006)). We simultaneously 
combine several analyst characteristics and optimally weight them based on a rolling 
regression framework to maximize their predictive power. Due to this approach, we find a 
significantly more pronounced heterogeneity which renders the majority of analyst 
recommendations worthless. Also, in contrast to an event study design, we use an investor-
oriented calendar time approach which allows more informative conjectures about the 
investment value of recommendations, e.g., in terms of transaction costs. Our findings are of 
particular relevance for mutual fund managers, since previous literature suggests that mutual 
fund managers are not capable to differentiate between good and bad sell side research 
(Busse, Green, and Jegadeesh (2012)). We find that the higher excess return of 
recommendations by able analysts is not simply caused by a reputation effect. The higher 
overall return of these recommendations is not driven by the immediate announcement return 
during the first trading days after the recommendations are issued. Instead, the higher returns 
materialize over a longer time window of several months. This suggests that able analysts can 
identify those stocks that outperform the market over a longer period, supposedly because the 
respective companies repeatedly release “good news”.  
Our study contributes to the literature in several ways. We extend the career concerns 
literature (e.g., Hong and Kubik (2003)) by showing that track records alone are insufficient 
to reduce information asymmetries in principal-agent relationships, because they can be 
heavily influenced by lucky outcomes. Our results suggest that analyst promotion and 
demotion decisions by brokers should be based on a combination of objectively measureable 
analyst skill attributes and the track record, in particular, if the investment value for clients is 
of primary concern. From the subset of analysts with a good track record, only those with 
high skill measures issue profitable stock recommendations and more accurate earnings 
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forecasts in the future. Our study shifts the focus from the career concerns of analysts (e.g., 
does an analyst with a better track record move to a more prestigious broker?) to the 
investment value for their clients. A fruitful opportunity for further research is an 
examination of the career outcomes of lucky analysts. For example, it would be interesting to 
study to what extent lucky outcomes in terms of earnings forecasts lead to unjustified 
outcomes on the labor market. The career concerns of lucky analysts over a longer time 
period might be of particular interest, e.g., are lucky analysts also demoted after not fulfilling 
initial employer expectations?  
Furthermore, our results have important implications for studies using analyst outputs as 
surrogates for market expectations. Based on our framework, we find that analysts with a 
significant advantage in forecasting earnings can be identified ex ante. This implies that 
equity valuation models to estimate the implied cost of capital of a firm (e.g., Gebhardt, Lee, 
and Swaminathan (2001)) could be improved by using only earnings forecasts of able 
analysts. 
We also present evidence on the rationale of analyst herding. Less skilled analysts perform 
best if their recommendations coincide with those of skilled analysts. In fact, they only 
produce investment value if they do not disagree with their more skilled peers. This strongly 
suggests that unable analysts should have an incentive to mimic more able colleagues. The 
herding literature so far has produced mixed results. While some studies suggest that analysts 
tend to follow each other (e.g., Jegadeesh and Kim (2010)), others find that there is also a 
tendency to anti-herd (e.g., Bernhardt, Campello, and Kutsoati (2006)). However, little 
attempt has been made to distinguish between more or less skilled analysts and to see 
whether one group is following the other. Our results suggest that differences in skills may be 
a driver of (rational) herding behavior.  
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Our study also complements literature on analyst rankings. Star analysts ranked high in the 
two most well-known analyst rankings, the “Best on the Street” ranking by the Wall Street 
Journal and the “All-American Research Team” ranking by Institutional Investor, do not 
outperform their peers in the year after becoming stars (Emery and Li (2009)). Our results 
imply that these rankings could be improved by using other criteria, since they do not have 
out-of-sample investment value for investors. More generally, our study provides a 
framework for other studies dealing with records that are influenced by lucky outcomes, e.g., 
studies on mutual fund or CEO performance, in how to differentiate between luck and skill.  
Chapter 3 switches the focus from the cross-section to the time series, i.e., we analyze time-
specific differences in respect to the information content of analyst recommendations and the 
investor reaction. It is the first study to examine analyst recommendations against the 
backdrop of the business cycle. We extend the literature which studies the importance of the 
business cycle for information processing on capital markets. For example, Boyd, Hu, and 
Jagannathan (2005) and Beber and Brandt (2010) find that investors process the same 
information differently depending on the business cycle. We contribute to this literature by 
showing that the information content of sell side research as well as the reaction of investors 
to this research is fundamentally different in expansions and recessions. In recessions, 
investors react significantly stronger to analyst recommendations, i.e., the price impact of 
recommendations is significantly higher. This finding suggests that sell side research is more 
valuable for investors in bad times. However, contrary to this notion, we find that “Buy” 
recommendations on average do not have long-term investment value in recessions. Investors 
strongly overreact to positively recommended stocks in recessions, indicating that investors 
overestimate the unique information set of analysts (Grossman and Stiglitz (1980)) in 
economic downturns. These findings supplement the results from chapter 2. In addition to 
cross-sectional differences in recommendation profitability (e.g., Hess, Kreutzmann, and 
Pucker (2012)), we also detect time dependent price formation patterns. While the results in 
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chapter 2 point out that only some analysts add value for investors, the results in chapter 3 
show that analysts on average even destroy value in recessions in terms of the long-term 
investment value of their “Buy” recommendations. 
We also contribute to the literature on recommendation profitability (e.g., Barber et al. 
(2001)) by showing that recommendation profitability is correlated with the business cycle. 
Therefore, it is important to control for the effects of macroeconomic fluctuations when 
assessing analysts’ stock recommendations. Specifically, we find that for “Buy” 
recommendations the initial excess return on the first four trading days is 0.67% higher in 
recessions than in expansions. For upgraded stocks, the difference is with 1.05% even larger. 
For “Sell” recommendations the initial excess return in recessions is 0.9% lower than in 
expansions respectively 1.26% lower for downgraded stocks. Over a longer time horizon, 
“Buy” recommendations generate positive excess returns of 0.38% over six months after the 
recommendation issuance (excluding the recommendation announcement day) in an 
expansion, but negative excess returns of -1.60% in recessions. This return difference of 
1.98% is similar for upgraded stocks. “Sell” recommendations generate an additional 
negative excess return of -2.83% in recessions compared to -2.02% in expansions after the 
recommendation announcement day.  
Moreover, we contribute to previous literature on systematic biases (e.g., Jegadeesh et al. 
(2004)). We find that analysts favor “glamour” stocks during recessions and expansions. The 
preference of analysts for “glamour” stocks is even slightly higher in recessions. The 
underlying economic rationale for this bias is questionable, since Lakonishok, Shleifer, and 
Vishny (1994) show that returns of growth stocks are lower in comparison to those of value 
stocks in recessions. Analyst recommendations are not fully in line with quantitative 
investment signals, particularly in economic downturns.  
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Chapter 4 of this thesis is based on the working paper “Do Aggregate Company Outlooks 
have Macroeconomic Content?”. This paper explores the information content of aggregated 
stock recommendations for macroeconomic developments. The underlying economic 
rationale of our study is the fact that the U.S. economy consists to a substantial extent of 
firms listed on the stock market. About one-third of all employees in the U.S. private business 
sector work at publicly traded companies (Davis (2006)). We therefore hypothesize that the 
development of the overall economy is significantly related to the development of firms listed 
on the stock market. As a measure for expected firm developments we use analyst stock 
recommendations. Equity analysts collect and process information at the firm level for 
publicly traded companies. Besides public macroeconomic-, industry- and company-specific 
content their information set should also comprise non-public company-specific information 
(Grossman and Stiglitz (1980)). Our central research question is whether aggregated analyst 
recommendations as a measure for the overall economic outlook of firms have predictive 
power for macroeconomic developments. We thereby follow the notion that the economy as a 
whole is the sum of all its individual parts. 
This paper contributes to the literature in several ways. First, we show that aggregated analyst 
outputs contain predictive power for future macroeconomic developments of about one year. 
The information content of aggregated analyst outputs is supplementary to well-established 
macroeconomic predictors such as the Leading Economic Indicator, the equity risk premium, 
the dividend yield, the default spread, the term spread, and the 3-month T-Bill rate. 
Therefore, aggregated analyst recommendations are useful for macroeconomic forecasts 
which are substantial to guide monetary policy decisions or federal tax cuts to stimulate 
economic growth.  
Second, our results provide a link between the studies of Howe, Unlu, and Yan (2009) and 
Stock and Watson (1998). Stock and Watson (1998) show that the stock market leads the real 
economy, while Howe, Unlu, and Yan (2009) provide evidence that aggregate analyst 
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recommendations predict the overall stock market. Our results fill the missing link between 
both studies, since we find that aggregate analyst recommendations also predict the real 
economy. We provide evidence that changes in expectations about future firm performance 
rationally (i.e., correct on average) determine asset values before overall economic activity 
changes. Therefore, our results provide a potential explanation for the old Wall Street saying 
that the stock market leads the economy. 
Third, we contribute to the literature on the information content of equity analyst outputs. We 
provide additional evidence that equity analysts provide useful information as intermediaries 
between firms and investors. Analyst outputs contain predictive power for macroeconomic 
developments. Implicitly or explicitly analysts anticipate macroeconomic developments when 
collecting information about the firms they cover. This finding supports the argument that the 
resources spent by information intermediaries are rewarded in terms of an information 
advantage.  
 
  
10 
 
Chapter 2 – The Good, The Bad, and The Lucky: Projected Earnings 
Accuracy and Profitability of Stock Recommendations  
2.1 Introduction 
Estimates about future company earnings are crucial to make stock investments. Firms that 
beat earnings expectations usually experience a significant stock price increase, while firms 
that fall short of earnings expectations can be severely punished by investors. Consequently, 
earnings forecasts are a central input for sell side analysts when making stock 
recommendations. More accurate earnings forecasts lead to superior firm valuations and in 
turn to more profitable stock recommendations. In this study, we analyze whether investors 
can identify ex ante more profitable stock recommendations when following analysts with 
higher projected earnings accuracy, i.e., analysts with superior knowledge of fundamentals. 
Most closely related to our research are the studies of Loh and Mian (2006) and Hall and 
Tacon (2010). Loh and Mian (2006) indicate a link between the accuracy of earnings 
projections and the profitability of recommendations. They show that following the 
recommendations of analysts who issue the most accurate earnings forecasts yields 
significant excess returns. This is plausible, because earnings forecasts and recommendations 
should be related, at least contemporaneously. However, the trading strategy suggested by 
Loh and Mian (2006) involves a look-ahead bias. To implement such a strategy investors 
would need to know in advance which analysts will have issued the most accurate earnings 
forecasts at the end of a given period. Hall and Tacon (2010) avoid this look-ahead bias and 
propose an implementable trading strategy focused on past performance, i.e., to follow only 
those analysts who have issued the most accurate earnings forecasts and/or the most 
profitable recommendations for the last period. Interestingly, their trading strategy does not 
yield excess returns.  
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Our interpretation of these conflicting results is that following analysts’ recommendations 
based on analysts’ past earnings track records alone does not adequately differentiate between 
analysts that have been lucky and analysts that are more able. In every period there may be 
some analysts whose earnings projections hit the target best just because some unforeseeable 
events happened. For example, an analyst who is always overly pessimistic will be relatively 
more accurate when a recession strikes. However, following this analyst’s recommendations 
next year is probably not a good advice, since the demonstrated higher accuracy was based on 
pure chance and not skill.  
We project out-of-sample the firm-specific annual earnings accuracy of analysts to ex ante 
identify analysts who produce superior earnings estimates. When forecasting analyst earnings 
accuracy, we only include information that is available ex ante. We therefore avoid the look-
ahead bias from Loh and Mian (2006). Since past earnings accuracy does not sufficiently 
forecast future accuracy (Hall and Tacon (2010)), our forecast model additionally uses 
analyst skill proxies that have shown explanatory power for earnings accuracy in-sample. For 
example, we use the experience of the analyst (e.g., Clement and Tse (2005), Hilary and Hsu 
(2013)) and the size of the broker the analyst is working for (e.g., Malloy (2005), Bae, Stulz, 
and Tan (2008)). A similar overall approach, albeit in a different field of research, is used by 
Boyer, Mitton, and Vorkink (2010) when identifying stocks with high idiosyncratic 
skewness: Since lagged skewness alone does not adequately forecast skewness, the authors 
use additional predictive variables.  
First, we document that investors actually can profit from the contemporaneous link between 
earnings accuracy and the recommendation profitability in the 1994 to 2010 time period. We 
rank analysts according to their projected earnings accuracy and define analysts with high 
projected earnings accuracy as “able” and analysts with low projected earnings accuracy as 
“unable”. Using an implementable trading strategy, we find that the recommendations of able 
analysts generate significant positive excess returns of 5.17% p.a. for the long portfolio and 
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7.57% p.a. for the long-minus-short portfolio, while the recommendations of unable analysts 
do not generate significant excess returns. Our findings suggest that only able analysts add 
value in the investment process. Investors must filter out the value-adding investment advice 
from sell side analysts to realize excess returns. In terms of transaction cost the critical 
threshold for the long portfolio is 1.53% per round-trip transaction. The market capitalization 
of the average stock covered by able analysts is with $8.4 billion relatively high therefore 
making it likely that investors can profit from able analysts even after accounting for 
transaction costs. 
Second, we define analysts as “lucky” if they have issued relatively more accurate earnings 
forecasts in the past, but are projected to issue relatively less accurate earnings forecasts in 
the future (i.e., a good track record, but low projected earnings accuracy). We find that 
recommendations of lucky analysts do not yield positive excess returns. Only analysts who 
have a good track record and high projected earnings accuracy due to their superior skill 
measures issue profitable recommendations. Our results suggest that investors must take into 
account the skills of analysts in addition to their past performance, i.e., look beyond their 
track record. This result also explains why the trading strategy of Hall and Tacon (2010) does 
not yield excess returns. The track record of an analyst is not sufficient to determine whether 
the analyst will issue profitable stock recommendations in the future. Investors must combine 
the track record with analyst skill measures to differentiate between able and lucky analysts. 
Only analysts with high skill proxies and a good track record also have a high projected 
earnings accuracy that translates into higher future recommendation profitability. 
Third, we observe significant differences in the profitability of individual stock 
recommendations issued by able, unable, and lucky analysts. Specifically, we evaluate the 
excess returns of recommendations if we hold a recommended stock until the corresponding 
earnings have been announced, until the point in time when the superior (versus inferior) 
forecasting ability materializes in a projected smaller (versus larger) surprise. We find that 
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especially “Strong Buy” and “Buy” recommendations of able analysts earn significantly 
higher returns than “Strong Buy” and “Buy” recommendations of unable or lucky analysts. 
This result indicates that able analysts can identify undervalued stocks.   
Fourth, we find that the higher excess return of the “Strong Buy” and “Buy” 
recommendations of able analysts is not simply caused by a reputation effect, this means that 
the higher overall return of these recommendations is not driven by the immediate 
announcement return during the first trading days after the recommendations are issued. 
Instead, the higher returns materialize over a longer time window of several months. This 
suggests that able analysts can identify those stocks that outperform the market over a longer 
period, supposedly because these companies repeatedly release “good news”. Our results can 
be interpreted as evidence that stock recommendations from able analysts add value in the 
investment decision process.  
Finally, when comparing the ex-post realized earnings accuracy among analysts in the 
projected accuracy quintiles, we find statistically and economically significant differences: 
the price-scaled absolute forecast error of able analysts is only half as large as the error of 
unable or lucky analyst (0.91% compared to 2.02% and 1.97%, respectively). In terms of 
absolute dollar values able analysts are about $0.21 more accurate. Assuming an average 
Price-to-Earnings ratio of 10, this advantage would translate into a stock valuation that is 
about 9% more accurate (based on a median stock price of $21 in our sample). These results 
suggest that the lower forecast error of able analysts also translates into higher 
recommendation profitability. 
Overall, our study provides evidence that the heterogeneity in analysts’ skill can be exploited 
by investors. To achieve excess returns, investors should only follow a subset of analysts with 
favorable characteristics. These analysts can be identified ex ante based on their projected 
future earnings accuracy. However, investors should not rely on analysts’ track records alone, 
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since track records are not very informative on a stand-alone basis. Only when combined 
with skill measures track records have predictive value out-of-sample. 
Our study contributes to the literature in several ways. We extent the analyst career concerns 
literature (e.g., Hong and Kubik (2003)) by showing that track records alone are not sufficient 
to reduce information asymmetries in principal-agent relationships, since they can be heavily 
influenced by lucky outcomes. We shift the focus from the career concerns of analysts, i.e., 
does an analyst with a better track record move to a more prestigious broker, to the 
investment value for the clients. Interestingly, the two most well-known analyst rankings, the 
“Best on the Street” ranking by the Wall Street Journal and the “All-American Research 
Team” ranking by Institutional Investor, do not have any significant investment value (Emery 
and Li (2009)). Our results suggest that analyst rankings as well as promotion and demotion 
decisions by brokers should be based on a combination of objectively measureable analyst 
skill attributes and the track record, in particular if the investment value for clients is the 
primary concern. From the subset of analysts with a good track record, only those with high 
skill measures issue profitable stock recommendations and more accurate earnings forecasts 
in the future.  Our research is also of interest for studies that deal with track records which 
are potentially influenced by lucky outcomes, e.g., when analyzing mutual fund or CEO 
performance. Furthermore, our findings are of particular relevance to mutual fund managers, 
since they are not able to differentiate between good and bad sell side research (Busse, Green, 
and Jegadeesh (2012)). In addition, our results have implications for studies using analysts’ 
outputs as surrogates for market expectations. As an example, equity valuation models based 
on discounted expected cash flows or (residual) earnings would be improved by using only 
superior forecasts, thereby reducing measurement error.1 
                                                     
1 For example, the quality of estimated risk premia implied in stock prices is presumably strongly affected by 
the quality of earnings forecasts (see, e.g., Bestelmeyer, Breunsbach, and Hess (2011)).  
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The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2.2 introduces the research 
design. Section 2.3 describes the data and explains the empirical approach in detail. Section 
2.4 presents the empirical results. Finally, section 2.5 concludes the paper. 
2.2 Research Design 
Our main research question is whether analysts who issue more profitable stock 
recommendations can be identified ex ante when forecasting their earnings accuracy. Hence, 
we predict the forecast accuracy of an analyst at the point in time when she provides her 
earnings forecast. Our approach is distinct from previous studies as we avoid a look-ahead 
bias. Furthermore, the predictive accuracy model incorporates several ability proxies to 
differentiate among analysts. Our approach comprises three steps:  
In the first step, we project out-of-sample the accuracy of annual earnings forecasts based on 
two different information sets: the first information set, ITRACK, incorporates exclusively the 
analysts’ past earnings accuracy (her “track record”). We consider both the firm–specific 
track record and the track record over all companies covered by the analyst and use track 
records over the preceding one and two years. The second information set used for 
forecasting, IFULL, includes ITRACK and additionally the information set ISKILL which consists 
of characteristics approximating analyst skill, such as her experience or her working 
environment. While these characteristics may not directly measure ability they are at least 
thought to be highly correlated with an analyst’s ability to generate accurate forecasts or her 
effort in doing so. Although both ITRACK and ISKILL provide imperfect proxies for the ability of 
an analyst to generate accurate forecasts, the distinction is crucial because the two are 
differently affected by noise. For example, an inexperienced analyst may have had luck last 
year, but luck is by definition not persistent. Then ITRACK would erroneously signal a high 
ability while ISKILL would not. Nevertheless, there may be two equally experienced analysts 
but one of them can better play out her experience and provide persistently more accurate 
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forecasts. In this case, ITRACK provides additional useful information. Hence, looking at both 
ITRACK and ISKILL together, i.e., at IFULL, provides a better assessment of an analyst’s true 
ability.  
In the second step, we classify analysts based on their projected earnings accuracy. We define 
an analyst with high (low) projected accuracy according to IFULL as able (unable). In a 
separate analysis, we rank analysts by independently sorting according to ITRACK and IFULL to 
differentiate between analysts who have high past earnings accuracy and high projected 
earnings accuracy and analysts who have high past earnings accuracy and low projected 
earnings accuracy, i.e., lucky analysts. Lucky analysts appear to be able based on their past 
earnings accuracy, although they are unable according to their skill measures. 
In the third step, we analyze the recommendation profitability of able, unable and lucky 
analysts separately. We use two different evaluation procedures: a trading strategy and an 
event-study design. 
2.3 Data and Methodology 
2.3.1 Data 
We use two analyst outputs: (1) annual earnings forecasts and the corresponding actual 
earnings from the Institutional Brokers Estimate System (I/B/E/S) and (2) stock 
recommendations by individual analysts also from I/B/E/S. Daily stock returns and daily 
market capitalizations come from The Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP). To 
calculate excess returns we use daily Fama and French and momentum factors provided by 
Kenneth R. French's website.2 We retrieve equity book values of individual companies from 
Compustat to calculate daily excess returns according to Daniel et al. (1997). Our sample 
                                                     
2 See Fama and French (1993) and Carhart (1997). The factors are retrieved from 
http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/. 
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starts in 1994, since recommendations in I/B/E/S are only available beginning in late 1993. 
Our final sample of recommendations covers the 1994 to 2010 time period.  
We retrieve individual analysts’ annual earnings forecasts from the I/B/E/S unadjusted detail 
files. We use earnings forecasts issued from January 1993 to December 2010 and we readjust 
the earnings following the recommendation of Wharton Research Data Services (WRDS).3 
We keep the forecasts issued in 1993, since we classify analysts beginning in January 1994 
based on the accuracy model covering the previous twelve months t-12. We apply the 
following filters to the data set: (1) we drop all firms that cannot be matched with CRSP, 
since stock returns are required for the trading strategy. (2) we only keep analysts in the 
sample that do not remain anonymous, since otherwise the characteristics of the analysts 
cannot be calculated for the accuracy model. (3) In line with the I/B/E/S guidelines, we use 
primary earnings until 1997 and diluted earnings from 1998 on. (4) we drop all observations 
which are issued more than two years before the earnings report date. (5) To control for 
obvious data errors, we drop all forecasts with a share price scaled forecast error above 25% 
(e.g., Loh and Mian (2006)). (6) We only keep firm years for which at least two analysts 
issue earnings forecasts, since the analyst characteristics are standardized relatively to other 
analysts issuing forecasts in the same firm year (e.g., Clement and Tse (2005)). (7) In line 
with previous studies (e.g., Hillary and Hsu (2013)) we only keep the last forecast issued by 
an analyst in the fiscal year in the regression analysis. We obtain a total of 709,450 earnings 
forecasts. 
We use the following filters for the stock recommendations: (8) we drop analysts that remain 
anonymous in I/B/E/S, since these analysts cannot be classified according to their 
characteristics. (9) In order to control for data errors we keep only one recommendation if 
more than one recommendation with the same rating, for the same firm, by the same analyst 
                                                     
3 Specifically, we follow “Method 3” suggested by Robinson and Glushkov (2006) which perhaps is “the most 
reliable and accurate way of joining Unadjusted Detail History and Actuals”. 
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on the same day has been issued. Our final sample consists of 331,121 stock 
recommendations. For convenience, the data filters and the corresponding number of 
observations for the annual earnings forecasts and the stock recommendations are 
summarized in Table 2.8 in Appendix 2 B. 
2.3.2 Projected Earnings Accuracy 
In the first step, we project the accuracy of earnings forecasts out-of-sample based on two 
different information sets IFULL and ITRACK. The out-of-sample projection is based on analyst- 
and forecast characteristics that have shown explanatory power for earnings accuracy in-
sample: BROKER_SIZE, the size of the broker the analyst is working for, (e.g., Bae, Stulz, 
and Tan (2008)), FOR_FREQUENCY, the frequency with which the analyst issues earnings 
forecasts (e.g., Clement and Tse (2005)), FIRM_EXPERIENCE, the number of years the 
analyst has covered the firm (e.g., Hilary and Hsu (2013)), GEN_EXPERIENCE, the overall 
number of years the analyst has covered firms (e.g., Sonney (2009)), COMPANIES, the 
number of companies the analyst covers (e.g., Clement and Tse (2005)), INDUSTRIES, the 
number of industries the analyst covers (e.g., Clement and Tse (2005)), BOLD, the distance 
between the analyst’s forecast and the consensus forecast (e.g., Hilary and Hsu (2013)), 
LAG_ACCURACY, the analyst’s earnings accuracy from the previous fiscal year for the 
firm (e.g., Clement and Tse (2005)), GEN_ACCURACY, the analyst’s earnings accuracy 
from the previous fiscal year for all firms he covered (e.g., Brown and Mohammad (2010)), 
DAYS_ELAPSED, the time elapsed since the last forecast issued by any analyst covering the 
firm (e.g., Clement and Tse (2005)), and FOR_HORIZON, the number of days between the 
forecast date and the fiscal year end (e.g., Malloy (2005)).4  
We use a rolling regression in order to avoid a look-ahead bias. The regressions are 
performed at the end of each month during the sample period 1/1994 to 12/2010. Hence, we 
                                                     
4 See Appendix 2 A for a more detailed description of the variables. 
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run 204 regressions. The rolling time window of these regressions covers the previous 12 
months before the month in which the earnings forecast was published. We produce out-of-
sample predictions of earnings accuracy based on the estimated analyst characteristics 
parameters from the rolling regression along with the observable characteristics at the time 
the earnings forecast is issued. Hence, we only use information available at the point in time 
when an analyst provides her earnings forecast. The rolling regression approach has the 
advantage that it can account for non-stable relationships between characteristics and 
earnings accuracy. For example, broker size and firm-specific experience lose their 
explanatory power for earnings accuracy after Regulation FD in 2000 (Findlay and Mathew 
(2006)). 
As an example, consider how the accuracy is projected for an earnings forecast that was 
issued in August 2006 for a firm with a fiscal year ending in December 2006: If an analyst 
issues an earnings forecast in August of 2006, the firm-specific characteristics of the analyst 
and the forecast are calculated for August of 2006. The earnings accuracy (for the fiscal year 
end) is projected by combining the analyst’s characteristics of August 2006 with the 
coefficients of the regression covering the August of 2005 to July of 2006 time period. When 
projecting the accuracy of the earnings forecast we separately use the two different 
information sets, e.g., only past earnings accuracy ITRACK or IFULL which combines ITRACK and 
analyst skill measures ISKILL. Since the reported earnings must be known to calculate earnings 
accuracy, in the regression we include only annual earnings forecasts for which the actuals 
have been already reported. The characteristics used for the out-of-sample projection of 
earnings accuracy can be classified into two information sets: 
ISKILL: Includes seven proxies for analyst skill, including the size of the broker the analyst is 
working for (BROKER_SIZE), the frequency with which the analyst issues earnings 
forecasts (FOR_FREQUENCY), the amount of time the analyst has covered the firm in the 
past (FIRM_EXPERIENCE), the amount of time the analyst has overall covered firms 
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(GEN_EXPERIENCE), the number of companies the analyst covers (COMPANIES), the 
number of industries the analyst covers (INDUSTRIES), and the deviation of the earnings 
forecast from the consensus (BOLD).  
ITRACK: Includes two proxies for the track record, including the analyst’s earnings accuracy 
from the previous fiscal year for the same firm (LAG_ACCURACY) and the analyst’s 
earnings accuracy from the previous fiscal year for all firms covered (GEN_ACCURACY). 
Additionally, we control for two forecast characteristics, including the time elapsed since the 
last forecast issued by any analyst covering the firm (DAYS_ELAPSED) and the horizon of 
the forecast (FOR_HORIZON). 
We separately analyze two different information sets ITRACK and IFULL. When we evaluate the 
power of past performance (ITRACK) for projecting earnings accuracy, we only include the 
track record and the forecast characteristics into the rolling regression. In contrast, IFULL 
additionally includes the analyst skill proxies (ISKILL). Below, the case for the entire 
information set, IFULL, is shown (coefficients 1–7 account for the information set ISKILL, 
coefficients 8–9 for ITRACK, and 10–11 for the forecast control variables): 
 (2.1) 
  
In line with previous studies, the characteristics and earnings accuracy are standardized 
relatively to other analysts to control for time- and firm-specific effects.5 A characteristic of 
                                                     
5 See, for example, Clement and Tse (2005), Herrmann and Thomas (2005), and Dechow and You (2012). Our 
results are similar, albeit weaker, when we standardize the variables according to Hong and Kubik (2003), i.e., 
ranking the analysts according to ijt-1
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between the analyst characteristics, e.g., in terms of the forecast error, are not taken into account. 
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analyst i (respectively of the forecast) for company j in time t-1 as explanatory variable is 
defined as: 
      
-1 -1
-1
-1 -1
_ - _ min
_ max - _ min
= ijt jtijt
jt jt
RAW CHARACTERISTIC RAW CHARACTERISTIC
CHARACTERISTIC
RAW CHARACTERISTIC RAW CHARACTERISTIC   (2.2) 
Analogously, the accuracy of the earnings forecasts is standardized relatively to other 
analysts who issued earnings forecasts in the same period t-1 for the same company j: 
                                                    (2.3) 
The results of the OLS rolling regression where IFULL is used as the information set are shown 
in Table 2.1: 
Table 2.1: Summary Statistics of the Rolling Regression 
This table shows the summary statistics of the OLS rolling regression (with White-corrected standard errors) 
performed in the 12/1993 to 11/2010 time period. The regression analysis is performed monthly covering the 
respective previous twelve months. The definitions of the characteristics can be found in Appendix 2 A. Column 
2 shows the coefficient’s arithmetic mean. Column 3 shows the percentage of the coefficients that are positive, 
column 4 shows the standard deviation of the coefficients, column 5 shows the average absolute t-value, column 
6 and 7 show the minimum respectively the maximum value of the coefficients. 
Average # of obs. 22,774 
Average R2   0.327 
Characteristic Average  Coeff. 
% of 
Coeff. > 0 
Standard  
Dev. of Coeff.
Avg. abs. 
t-value 
Min. 
 Coeff. 
Max. 
 Coeff. 
BROKER_SIZE -0.007 26.5 0.013 2.36 -0.031 0.017 
FOR_FREQUENCY 0.066 100.0 0.027 8.59 0.012 0.104 
FIRM_EXPERIENCE -0.011 23.0 0.014 1.97 -0.052 0.013 
GEN_EXPERIENCE 0.008 77.5 0.011 1.40 -0.012 0.790 
COMPANIES 0.002 56.4 0.013 1.57 -0.028 0.024 
INDUSTRIES -0.019 5.9 0.013 3.00 -0.040 0.020 
BOLD -0.082 4.9 0.061 7.86 -0.209 0.004 
LAG_ACCURACY 0.082 100.0 0.018 10.39 0.027 0.115 
GEN_ACCURACY 0.103 100.0 0.032 6.22 0.049 0.170 
DAYS_ELAPSED -0.063 0.0 0.021 5.96 -0.101 -0.013 
FOR_HORIZON -0.740 0.0 0.064 65.94 -0.844 -0.588 
constant 0.699 100.0 0.052 50.30 0.585 0.790 
On average we use 22,774 observations in each of the 204 regressions. Overall, the results are 
in line with other studies such as Clement and Tse (2005). We find differences in respect to 
broker size (BROKER_SIZE) and the number of companies covered (COMPANIES), since 
these characteristics do not have a time-stable impact on earnings accuracy. Also, in contrast 
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to Clement and Tse (2005), we find that firm experience (FIRM_EXPERIENCE) has overall 
a negative impact on earnings accuracy. Regulatory changes are possible reasons for changes 
in the relationship between characteristics and earnings accuracy. The advantage of our 
rolling regression approach is that it incorporates such non-stable relationships. Determining 
the influence of the characteristics only once, e.g., at the beginning of the sample period, 
would not be sufficient to capture this effect. 
Next, we produce one-step-ahead forecasts of earnings accuracy based ISKILL and ITRACK. The 
characteristics of the analysts and forecasts are standardized relative to the annual earnings 
forecasts made in the respective previous 12 months. The one-step-ahead projection based on 
IFULL is given by 
 
                (2.4) 
 
where i are the coefficients obtained from the rolling regression. We do not include the 
forecast characteristics in the projection, because the forecast horizon and the time elapsed 
since the last forecast are not intrinsic characteristics of the analyst. For example, an analyst 
issuing a forecast two months before the end of the fiscal year is very likely to be more 
accurate than an analyst issuing a forecast six months before the end of the fiscal year, even if 
the latter analyst has superior forecast abilities. We focus on the forecast ability of an analyst, 
estimated only on the basis of an analyst’s skill proxies and her track record.  
2.3.3 Identification of Able, Unable and Lucky Analysts 
In a second step, we use the projected intrinsic accuracy to identify able, unable and lucky 
analysts. Specifically, we rank analysts according to their projected intrinsic accuracy 
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(Equation (2.4)). The ranking is conducted monthly during the period from 1994 to 2010. In 
line with previous studies (e.g., Loh and Mian (2006)) we use quintiles for discriminating 
between analysts. The classification is firm-specific. This implies that an analyst may be 
simultaneously classified as able for one company and unable for another company, e.g., 
because he has covered one of the two companies longer and therefore has a better 
understanding of the company fundamentals respectively is more connected within the firm. 
The quintiles for the analyst classification are calculated market-wide, i.e., all analysts 
classified in a given month are compared across firms. Analyst characteristics are 
standardized to control for firm- and time-specific effects. The advantage of this approach is 
that we do not require at least five analysts issuing an earnings forecast for the same firm in a 
given month. The firm-specific classification is effective until the firm’s (for which the 
forecast is issued) fiscal year report date or until the classification changes. For example, an 
analyst could be classified as neither able nor unable according to her first earnings forecast 
for a given firm but as able according to the second earnings forecast made by her for the 
same firm year (e.g., because she has moved to a different broker in between).   
We monthly classify analysts as able (unable) if they belong to the upper (lower) intrinsic 
accuracy quintile according to information set IFULL, i.e., we incorporate all available analyst 
information according to our model. Next, we sort analysts independently according to their 
past earnings accuracy (ITRACK) and their past earnings accuracy and skill proxies combined 
(IFULL) in order to differentiate between the lucky winners and the able winners of the 
earnings game. We use one-year and two-year earnings track records.6  
We classify analysts as lucky if they belong to the upper two intrinsic accuracy quintiles in 
terms of ITRACK and to the lowest intrinsic accuracy quintile in terms of IFULL. This implies 
                                                     
6 In the case of the two-year track record the information set IFULL incorporates the two-year track record as well. 
24 
 
that lucky analysts have a superior earnings track record, but are unable according to their 
skill proxies.7   
Table 2.2 reports summary statistics for the final sample of stock recommendations we obtain 
after linking analysts’ earnings forecasts and recommendations. The sample covers the 1994 
to 2010 time period and consists of 331,121 recommendations. 50,602 recommendations 
come from analysts classified as able, 86,466 recommendations from unable, and 10,161 
recommendations from lucky analyst. As a remainder, the same amount of analysts is 
classified as able and unable based on their projected earnings accuracy. Therefore, the 
numbers indicate that unable analysts are more active in issuing stock recommendations. 
Table 2.2 also shows that able analysts on average cover stocks with a market capitalization 
above the mean of the covered stocks, while unable and lucky analysts cover stocks with a 
smaller market capitalization:  
                                                     
7 Technically, we identify analysts with a high projected earnings accuracy based on only their past earnings 
accuracy. However, only analysts with high past earnings accuracy can have high projected earnings accuracy 
according to equation (2.4).  
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Table 2.2: Summary Statistics for the Stock Recommendations  
This table provides the number of recommendations issued, the number of stocks covered, and the number of analysts for each year in the 1994 to 2010 sample period. 
The last row gives the average market capitalization (USD in thousands) of the covered stocks (on the day the recommendations are issued). Lucky analysts are 
classified based on their one-year track record. 
 All Analysts  Able Analysts  Unable Analysts  Lucky Analysts  
Year  Recs Stocks Analysts  Recs Stocks Analysts  Recs Stocks Analysts  Recs Stocks Analysts
1994  15,063 2,539 1,594 2,532 393 228 3,902 778 501 308 261 206
1995  14,896 2,640 1,756 2,339 374 253 3,948 853 502 152 125 112
1996  12,741 2,585 1,888 1,906 345 252 3,495 835 615 253 220 189
1997  9,289 2,475 1,750 1,577 422 289 2,352 722 500 67 61 63
1998  16,860 2,959 2,534 2,327 387 337 4,988 1,019 792 244 214 195
1999  19,384 3,165 2,753 2,731 428 317 5,335 1,045 843 1,015 691 644
2000  17,024 2,878 2,680 2,192 343 310 4,662 975 821 440 361 339
2001  18,319 2,793 2,563 2,590 473 310 6,224 1,005 1,086 1,226 759 686
2002  29,756 2,928 2,698 4,658 505 335 8,218 924 914 1,371 797 661
2003  24,452 2,868 2,674 3,533 433 358 6,583 906 887 484 367 307
2004  21,239 2,855 2,822 2,998 373 358 5,748 1,006 846 543 423 357
2005  19,659 3,045 2,836 3,175 376 424 4,813 1,004 741 539 425 391
2006  20,522 3,166 2,856 3,448 474 467 4,628 926 719 688 531 495
2007  21,876 3,184 2,897 3,757 465 434 4,820 901 760 887 612 563
2008  25,150 3,257 2,895 3,898 421 362 5,969 1,031 822 708 540 486
2009  23,345 2,982 2,725 3,505 403 343 5,742 935 804 600 451 431
2010 21,546 2,923 2,910 3,436 406 454 5,039 900 765 636 498 461
Total  331,121 49,242 42,831 50,602 7,021 5,831 86,466 15,765 12,918 10,161 7,336 6,586
MC Ø  8,432,402  9,279,443  6,241,638  7,240,515 
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Table 2.3 reports the summary statistics for the mean analyst characteristics. Able analysts 
issue significantly more earnings forecasts for the firms they cover, cover less industries, 
deviate less from the consensus forecast, and have issued significantly more accurate 
forecasts in the previous year. The characteristics of the unable and lucky analysts are very 
similar with exception of the past earnings accuracy, since lucky analysts are defined as 
analysts with high past earnings accuracy and low skill.  
Table 2.3: Summary Statistics for the Analyst Characteristics 
This table reports summary statistics for the analyst characteristics. Lucky analysts are classified based on their 
one-year track record. Panel A shows the unstandardized analyst characteristics. Forecast Frequency is the 
number of forecasts issued by the analyst in the firm year. Boldness is the absolute deviation in dollar from the 
90-day consensus on the day the forecast is issued. Lagged Accuracy is the price-scaled absolute forecast error 
for the same firm in the last fiscal year. General Accuracy is the price-scaled absolute forecast error over all 
firms in the last year. The second part of the table shows the standardized analyst characteristics. The definitions 
of the standardized analyst characteristics can be found in Appendix 2 A. 
 
All Analysts Able (Q5) Q4 Q3 Q2 
Unable 
(Q1) 
Lucky 
Broker Size (# analysts) 
l )
53.82 52.70 54.95 55.33 55.00 51.63 57.69 
Forecast Frequency (#) 4.74 7.39 5.83 4.76 3.87 3.19 3.05 
Firm Experience (years) 3.61 3.99 3.94 3.66 3.37 3.34 2.77 
General Experience 7.32 7.66 7.59 7.35 7.09 7.12 6.51 
# of covered Companies 15.72 15.53 16.16 15.92 15.83 15.29 13.84 
# of covered Industries 3.85 3.46 3.74 3.86 3.96 4.03 3.89 
Boldness ($) 0.17 0.09 0.12 0.14 0.18 0.25 0.39 
Lagged Accuracy (%) 0.72 0.32 0.38 0.48 0.65 1.41 0.30 
General Accuracy (%) 0.74 0.51 0.59 0.66 0.74 1.04 0.45 
BROKER_SIZE 0.38 0.36 0.38 0.38 0.39 0.39 0.42 
FOR_FREQUENCY 0.43 0.73 0.54 0.42 0.34 0.28 0.22 
FIRM_EXPERIENCE 0.38 0.42 0.40 0.37 0.34 0.37 0.27 
GEN_EXPERIENCE 0.40 0.42 0.41 0.39 0.38 0.40 0.34 
COMPANIES 0.39 0.39 0.40 0.39 0.39 0.39 0.38 
INDUSTRIES 0.35 0.27 0.32 0.34 0.36 0.40 0.42 
BOLD 0.28 0.13 0.17 0.22 0.30 0.46 0.64 
LAG_ACCURACY 0.81 0.95 0.93 0.89 0.83 0.57 0.97 
GEN_ACCURACY 0.81 0.88 0.86 0.84 0.81 0.72 0.91 
The mean analyst characteristics should be interpreted carefully, however, since we use a 
dynamic model. While past accuracy and forecast frequency have a stable impact on earnings 
accuracy, the impact of the other characteristics varies over time and in some cases even 
reverses. For example, able analysts tend to cover a relatively small amount of companies in 
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the 1994 to 1997 time period, while they cover significantly more companies in the 2006 to 
2010 period (unreported results). Our model accounts for such non-stable relationships. 
2.3.4 Profitability of Recommendations 
2.3.4.1 Trading Strategy 
We analyze the profitability of recommendations issued by able, unable, and lucky analysts. 
In order to facilitate a comparison to previous studies, we perform a trading strategy similar 
to Loh and Mian (2006) and Barber et al. (2001), however, using only ex ante information, 
i.e., making the trading strategy implementable. Following Loh and Mian (2006), we 
calculate the consensus recommendation of a stock based on the recommendations issued in 
the corresponding previous six months. We perform the trading strategy separately according 
to our classification of analysts, i.e., we separately analyze the profitability of able, unable, 
and lucky analysts.  
A single recommendation A assumes values between 1 and 5, where a rating of 1 reflects a 
“Strong Buy” recommendation, 2 a “Buy”, 3 a “Hold”, 4 a “Sell”, and 5 a “Strong Sell”, 
respectively. For example, if one “Strong Buy” recommendation and one “Buy” 
recommendation have been issued within the previous six months for firm j, the current 
consensus recommendation for firm j would be 1.5 for the six-month consensus calculation 
period: 
 
j 1n
j 1 j 1 ij 1
i 1
A 1 / n A
t-
t- t- t-
=
= å    (2.5) 
Based to the consensus recommendation, we assign each stock on the following trading day 
(1) to the long portfolio if jτ 1A 1.5- £ (implying that the consensus recommendation is at 
least between “Strong Buy” and “Buy”)8 or (2) to the short portfolio if j 1A 2.5  . The 
portfolio classifications follow Barber et al. (2006) and Loh and Mian (2006). Also in line 
                                                     
8 Using a consensus recommendation of jτ 1A 2- £ for the long portfolio yields the same overall conclusions.  
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with previous studies we buy (sell) a stock at the opening price of the following trading day 
after announcement in order to avoid trading before the recommendation was available.  
The stocks assigned to the long portfolio or short portfolio  are weighted according to 
market capitalization on the prior trading day. jx 1t-  is the market value of equity for firm j at 
the close of trading on date τ 1-  divided by the aggregate market capitalization of all firms in 
portfolio  at the close of trading on that date. jR t is the return of firm j’s common stock on 
date t and 1rt-n is the number of firms in portfolio at the close of trading on day 1t - :  
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 The daily excess returns of the long- and short portfolio are calculated according to 
Carhart’s (1997) four-factor-model: 
 R  rf (Rm rf ) s SMB h HML m UMDrt t r r t r t r t r t rt- =a +b - + + + +e   (2.7) 
To calculate portfolio turnover we follow Barber et al. (2001). First, we calculate the 
hypothetical weight jG 1t- for each stock j in portfolio at the end of the trading day τ 1- , 
i.e., the weight if the portfolio would not have been rebalanced:  
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Next, the hypothetical weight jG t  is compared to stock’s j actual weight jF t in the portfolio 
at the end of trading day τ . Finally, the daily portfolio turnover jU t  is calculated as the sum 
of the potential decreases in weights for all stocks j on date τ : 
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The annual portfolio turnover is calculated as the daily portfolio turnover jU t times the 
number of trading days in the year. 
2.3.4.2 Event-Study 
We also address the profitability of recommendations issued by able, unable, and lucky 
analysts with an event-study design (e.g., Womack (1996)). We analyze the extent to which 
differences in returns are due to the forecasting skills of the analysts: does the market react 
differently to the recommendations of an able analyst compared to the recommendations of 
an unable analyst? When does the return of the recommendation materialize? For example, 
investors may primarily follow the recommendations of able analysts. If the excess returns 
associated with recommendations can be attributed to such a reputation effect, we expect a 
strong post announcement effect, e.g., a large positive return immediately after an able 
analyst has issued a “Strong Buy” recommendation and only average returns thereafter. 
Hence, we would expect that the vast majority of the excess return associated with a 
recommendation is realized immediately after the recommendation was issued. We analyze 
recommendations levels as well as recommendation changes.9     
For the five level recommendation categories (“Strong Buy” to “Strong Sell”) we analyze the 
excess returns if the single recommendations were followed. Since an analyst is classified 
based on an earnings forecast made prior to the recommendation in the firm year, we hold the 
recommendation until the earnings report date of the respective stock plus three trading days. 
Therefore, we hold a recommended stock until the corresponding earnings have been 
announced (plus three trading days), i.e., until the point in time when the superior (versus 
inferior) forecasting ability has materialized in a smaller (versus larger) surprise. Analogously 
to the trading strategy we follow a stock beginning one trading day after the recommendation 
announcement, i.e., we do not include the return on the first trading day.  We separate the 
                                                     
9 Recommendations changes contain more predictive power than recommendation levels (e.g., Jegadeesh, Kim, 
Krische, and Lee (2004)). 
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entire recommendation holding period which spans from one trading day after 
recommendations announcement to the earnings report date plus three trading days, into three 
different time windows:  
Figure 2.1: Holding Periods of Individual Recommendations 
This figure shows the respective holding periods that are analyzed in the event study. We separate the total 
holding period spanning from the first trading day after announcement (not including the announcement day) to 
three trading days after the earnings report date into three time windows: (1) The time window covering the first 
three trading days after recommendation announcement (not including the excess return on the announcement 
day), (2) the intermediate time window spanning from three trading days after announcement to three trading 
days before earnings report date, and (3) the excess return from three trading days before until three trading days 
after the earnings report date. Note that the three time windows combined are equal to the total holding period. 
 
 (1) The initial three trading days after the recommendation announcement (not including the 
recommendation announcement day), (2) the intermediate time window between three 
trading days after recommendation announcement and three trading days before the earnings 
report date, and (3) the time window spanning three trading days before until three trading 
days after the earnings announcement. The total holding period return is equal to the three 
time windows combined. 
We also analyze recommendations changes and assign recommendations to either a “Buy 
portfolio” or “Sell portfolio” as outlined by Cohen, Frazzini, and Malloy (2010). The “Buy 
portfolio” consists of all upgraded stocks and stocks for which the analyst initiates, resumes 
or reiterates her coverage with a “Strong Buy” or “Buy” recommendation. The short portfolio 
consists of all downgraded stocks and stocks for which the analyst initiates, resumes or 
reiterates her coverage with a “Hold”, “Sell” or “Strong Sell” recommendation. We do not 
include the return of the recommendation announcement day in the analysis. A stock is held 
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in the portfolio until the earnings have been announced plus three trading days as long as the 
recommendation is not revised before the earnings announcement day. If a recommendation 
is revised before the earnings announcement we hold the underlying stock one additional day 
after the revision in our portfolio. 
We calculate daily excess returns for firm i on trading day t according to Daniel et al. (1997) 
as shown in Equation 2.10. From each stock’s raw return we subtract the return on a value-
weighted portfolio of all CRSP firms in the same size, (industry-adjusted) market-to-book 
ratio and one-year momentum quintile. We use the Fama and French 48-industry 
classification and update the 125 characteristic portfolios at the end of June of each year:  
(2.10) 
The cumulative adjusted returns (CAR) are calculated for the three event windows specified 
above. To control for outliers the mean returns are winsorized at the 99% level:  
(2.11) 
2.4 Results 
2.4.1 Results of the Trading Strategy 
The results of the trading strategy are reported in Table 2.4. Panel A shows a strong 
heterogeneity in respect to recommendation profitability of the long portfolio: the returns 
decrease monotonically from Q5 to Q1. The long portfolio based on able analysts’ stock 
recommendations generates significant positive excess returns of 5.17% p.a. in the 1994 to 
2010 sample period, while the Q4 portfolio generates significant excess returns of 3.13% p.a. 
In contrast, the portfolio based on unable analysts’ stock recommendations and the portfolios 
in the remaining two quintiles Q3 and Q2 generate no excess returns. The return difference 
between the able and unable analysts of 5.99% p.a. is statistically and economically highly 
significant.   
it it itER  Raw _ Re turn - DGTW _ Benchmark _ Return
       

T
itT it
t=t
CAR = ER
       

32 
 
Table 2.4: Trading Strategy – Information Set IFULL 
This table shows the results of the trading strategy in the 1994 to 2010 time period for analysts classified 
according to information set IFULL. Panel A shows the annualized four-factor excess returns for all quintiles for 
the Long Portfolio, the Short Portfolio, and the Long-Short Portfolio. Panel B shows the summary statistics for 
the portfolios of the able and unable analysts. Columns 1 to 4 show the coefficient estimates of equation (2.6) 
for the market excess return (Rm-rf), the size portfolio (SMB), the book-to-market portfolio (HML), and the 
momentum portfolio UMD). Column 5 shows the adjusted R2 from the regression performed in Equation (2.6), 
column 6 shows the average daily number of firms in the respective portfolio, and column 7 shows the annual 
portfolio turnover in % from Equation (2.8). The t-statistics are shown in parentheses below the estimates. The 
significance levels are indicated as follows: *** 1% significance, ** 5% significance, * 10% significance. 
 Panel A: Ability Quintiles according to Information Set IFULL  
 Able (Q5) Q4 Q3 Q2 Unable (Q1) Q5 - Q1 
Long 5.17%*** 3.13%** 0.93% 0.18% -0.78% 5.99%*** 
(3.03) (2.17) (0.67) (0.13) (-0.55) (2.67) 
Short -2.24% -1.35% -0.96% -1.81% -0.05% -2.19% 
(-1.49) (-1.05) (-0.74) (-1.48) (-0.04) (-1.13) 
Long-Short 7.57%*** 4.54%** 1.90% 2.02% -0.73% 8.36%*** 
(3.11) (2.16) (0.92) (0.97) (-0.35) (2.56) 
 
 
 
Panel B: Summary Statistics for the Portfolios of the Able and Unable Analysts 
 
Rm-rf SMB HML UMD Adj. R2 # of Firms 
Annual 
Turnover (%)
Long   
Able (Q5)  1.06***  -0.11***  -0.18***  -0.021  0.91  172.0 338.0% 
(112.95) (-5.82) (-9.27) (-1.61)  
  
Unable (Q1) 1.05*** -0.043* -0.15*** 0.12*** 0.92 284.0 270.7% 
(107.44) (-2.36) (-10.73) (13.27)  
Short   
Able (Q5) 0.966*** -0.115*** 0.128** -0.086*** 0.91 345.5 266.9%
(133.97) (-6.48) (7.25) (-6.73)  
  
Unable (Q1) 0.992*** -0.0862*** 0.207*** -0.0476***  0.94 559.9 226.8% 
(146.59) (-6.42) (13.24) (-4.79)  
Long-Short  
Able (Q5) 0.098*** 0.008    -0.309*** 0.066*** 0.16 517.5 604.9%
(7.68)    (0.27)    (-12.02)   (3.88)    
  
Unable (Q1) 0.0540*** 0.0435    -0.354*** 0.168*** 0.27 843.9 497.5%
  (3.81)    (1.59)    (-14.55)   (10.98)    
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Our results imply that investors should only follow stock recommendations of analysts with 
superior characteristics. Investors must filter out the profitable recommendations to realize 
excess returns. 
Table 2.4 Panel A also shows that there is very limited heterogeneity among analysts in 
respect to recommendation profitability of the short portfolio. None of the five analyst 
quintiles issue profitable recommendations. Interestingly, Cohen, Frazzini, and Malloy 
(2010) come to a similar result when differentiating between analysts in respect to their 
school ties: buy recommendations on school-tied stocks outperform buy recommendations on 
non-tied stocks, while sell recommendations do not. We find that able analysts only have an 
advantage in identifying undervalued stocks.  
Combining the long and the short portfolio leads to significant excess returns of 7.57% p.a. 
when following only able analysts respectively to a return of 4.54% p.a. when following only 
the analysts in the fourth quintile. The long-minus-short portfolios of the remaining three 
analyst quintiles are not profitable. The return difference between the able and unable 
analysts of 8.36% p.a. is both economically and statistically significant. Overall, these 
findings indicate that it is crucial for investors to differentiate among analysts based on their 
projected earnings accuracy. Able analysts issue profitable recommendations and, therefore, 
add value in the investment decision process.  
A related question is the impact of transaction costs, i.e., are the returns of the trading 
strategy economically significant after accounting for the costs of trading the securities? The 
annual turnover of the long portfolio of able analysts is 338% p.a. Therefore, the net return 
after transaction costs would be positive up to round-trip transaction costs of around 1.53% 
(5.17%/3.38). The respective threshold round-trip costs for the short portfolio are around 
0.84% and 1.23% for the long-short portfolio. Since the average stock covered by the analyst 
has a relatively high market capitalization of around $8.4 billion (Table 2.2), the average 
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round-trip transaction cost, at least for the long portfolio, are most likely lower than the 
thresholds. It should also be noted that the annual turnover of the portfolios is high, because 
we use daily rebalancing. The trading strategy employed here is not optimized in terms of 
transaction costs. Nevertheless, our results indicate that the net return, at least for the long 
portfolio, is very likely still economically significant after accounting for transaction costs.  
In a separate analysis we address the question whether the past earnings track record of an 
analyst is sufficient to forecast stock recommendation profitability. We examine analysts with 
a superior track record, i.e., analysts who belong to the upper two accuracy quintiles in terms 
of ITRACK. As a remainder, ITRACK comprises the firm-specific and the general track record 
(over all covered firms) of an analyst. We independently sort analysts based on their track 
record and on the information set including the track record and analyst skill proxies (IFULL). 
Table 2.5 shows the intersection of analysts that belong to the upper two accuracy quintiles in 
terms of their past earnings accuracy and the ability quintiles analyzed in Table 2.4. The 
results are shown for one-year and two-year track records. The results reveal that the earnings 
track record, i.e., information set ITRACK, is not sufficient to ex ante identify the analysts who 
issue more profitable recommendations. From the group of analysts with a superior track 
record, analysts in the upper ability quintile issue profitable recommendations in the long 
portfolio for the one-year and two-year track record period. The returns are 3.72% p.a. for the 
one-year track record and 4.94% p.a. for the two-year track record. Furthermore, analysts in 
the fourth ability quintile issue profitable stock recommendations for the one-year track 
record period that yield 3.65% p.a. The stock recommendations in the long portfolio of the 
remaining analysts are not profitable. The portfolios based on recommendations of lucky 
analysts even generate negative (albeit statistically insignificant) excess returns. The short 
portfolio generates significant excess returns for the third and fourth ability quintile when 
looking at the one-year track record. The long-short portfolio is significant for the upper three 
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quintiles when looking at the one year track record, but only significant for the upper quintile 
for the two-year track record.  
Table 2.5: Trading Strategy – Lucky Analysts  
This table shows the results of the trading strategy in the 1994 to 2010 time period for analysts that belong to the 
upper two quintiles according to ITRACK. The analysts are independently sorted according to information set 
IFULL. The table shows the annualized four-factor excess returns for all quintiles for the Long Portfolio, the Short 
Portfolio, and the Long-Short Portfolio. We use one-year and two-year earnings track records. The t-statistics 
are shown in parentheses below the estimates. The significance levels are indicated as follows: *** 1% 
significance, ** 5% significance, * 10% significance. 
 Track Record Q5 Q4 Q3 Q2 Lucky (Q1) Q5 - Q1 
Long 1-year 3.72%* 3.65%** 0.67% -0.39% -5.81% 10.12%**
(1.86) (2.07) (0.36) (-0.17) (-1.55) (2.22) 
Short -2.38% -2.64%* -3.84%** -0.90% -2.60% 0.23% 
(-1.45) (-1.69) (-2.35) (-0.55) (-0.96) (0.07) 
Long-Short 6.25%** 6.46%*** 4.68%* 0.65 -3.29 9.87%* 
(2.23) (2.61) (1.81) (0.22) (-0.71) (1.74) 
Long 2-year 4.94%** 0.44% 1.37% 1.68% -2.07% 7.16% 
(2.43) (0.21) (0.61) (0.52) (-0.46) (1.40) 
Short -0.37% -1.50% -0.24% -2.43% -4.69% 4.53% 
(-0.20) (-0.85) (-0.14) (-1.23) (-1.48) (1.20) 
Long-Short 5.48%** 2.03% 1.43% 4.21% 2.67% 2.73% 
(1.96) (0.73) (0.48) (1.05) (0.48) (0.44) 
Our findings explain why the trading strategy proposed by Hall and Tacon (2010) does not 
yield excess returns, since following all analysts only based on their good track record is not 
sufficient to differentiate between able and lucky analysts. Analysts who issue more 
profitable recommendations in the future cannot be identified based on a one-dimensional 
evaluation of their record without taking into account other ability proxies. From the analysts 
with high past earnings accuracy only those with high projected earnings accuracy issue 
profitable stock recommendations in the next period. On a stand-alone basis past earnings 
accuracy is not sufficient in order to identify able analysts. Following the winners of last 
year’s earnings game does not translate into more profitable stock recommendations in the 
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following year, because only some of those analysts are expected to also issue accurate 
earnings forecasts in the future. The skill of an analyst must be scrutinized in addition to her 
track record. Some analysts appear to be able based on their track record, while in fact they 
are unable, i.e., they do not have higher forecast skills. 
2.4.2 Results of the Event-Study 
Next, we analyze which returns an investor can expect on average if individual 
recommendations provided by an able, unable, or lucky analysts were followed in an event-
study setting. We analyze different holding periods to address possible reasons for 
differences in the profitability of the recommendations of able, unable, and lucky analysts: 
does the market react differently to the recommendations of an able analyst compared to the 
recommendations of an unable analyst? When does the excess return of the recommendation 
materialize? The results are reported in Table 2.6. Note that the returns are not annualized 
and that analogously to the trading strategy we do not include the stock return on the first 
trading day. The mean excess returns implicitly assume equally-weighted portfolios. We lose 
about 11.3% of observations due to the required DGTW matching criteria of CRSP with 
Compustat. 
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Table 2.6: Profitability of Individual Stock Recommendations and Upgrades 
/Downgrades 
This table shows the profitability of single stock recommendations and Buy/Sell portfolios (following Cohen, 
Frazzini, and Malloy (2010)) for able, unable, and lucky analysts. The respective event windows are displayed 
in Figure 2.1. Column 1 shows the number of recommendations. Column 2 shows the average number of 
trading days until the earnings report date (for single recommendations) respectively until the earnings report or 
revision (Buy and Sell portfolios). Column 3 shows the mean DGTW excess return in the total holding period. 
Column 4 shows the mean DGTW excess return on the first three trading days after recommendation 
announcement (not including the announcement day). Column 5 shows the mean DGTW excess return between 
three trading days after recommendation announcement and three trading days before the earnings for the 
respective stock are reported or revision (Buy and Sell portfolios). Column 6 shows the mean excess return from 
three trading days before the earnings announcement until three trading days after the earnings announcement 
(for Buy/Sell portfolios only if they are not revised before). Column 7 shows the mean DGTW excess return on 
the announcement day (not included in the total holding period). Panel B shows the differences in mean DGTW 
excess returns between able and unable respectively between able and lucky analyst. Significance levels are 
indicated as follows: *** 1% significance, ** 5% significance, * 10% significance. 
Panel A: Able, Unable, and Lucky Analysts 
Rec No. Holding Total Holding Initial Three Intermediate Return around Return 
Category of Rec Days Period Return Days Return Earn. Report First Day 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Able Analysts 
Strong Buy 10,427 169.0 2.04%*** 0.34%*** 1.33%*** 0.36%*** 1.30%***
Buy 12,985 164.1 2.34%*** 0.09%** 2.03%*** 0.26%*** 0.60%***
Hold 18,878 170.1 0.95%*** -0.21%*** 1.14%*** 0.07% -1.06%***
Sell 2,203 177.9 -1.68%** -0.39%*** -0.74% -0.32% -1.65%***
Strong Sell 1,270 183.5 -3.51%*** -0.46%*** -2.29% -0.69%*** -1.72%***
Buy PF 21,614 111.0 3.40%*** 0.86%*** 1.11%*** 0.36%*** 1.15%***
Sell PF 21,276 115.3 1.58%*** 0.13%*** 0.41%* 0.06% -1.38%***
Unable Analysts 
Strong Buy 17,428 222.1 0.49% 0.44%*** 0.01% 0.15%** 1.13%***
Buy 22,231 215.5 0.52% 0.07%** 0.44% 0.09% 0.39%***
Hold 30,372 223.4 -0.41% -0.30%*** -0.05% -0.03% -1.25%***
Sell 3,594 235.1 -1.99%*** -0.55%*** -0.93% -0.45%*** -1.81%***
Strong Sell 1,854 222.8 -2.76%*** -0.67%*** -1.34% -0.45%** -1.71%***
Buy PF 36,499 145.8 2.11%*** 0.88%*** -0.32% 0.12%* 0.89%***
Sell PF 34,631 151.0 -0.16% 0.05% -1.18%*** -0.09% -1.50%***
Lucky Analysts (1-year track record) 
Strong Buy 2,007 289.1 0.42% 0.50%*** 0.24% -0.10% 1.27%***
Buy 2,675 266.2 0.75% 0.20%** 0.73% -0.13% 0.51%***
Hold 3,704 251.8 0.11% -0.28%*** 0.78% -0.19% -1.71%***
Sell 455 263.1 -3.35% -0.74%*** -1.96% -0.68% -2.25%***
Strong Sell 221 279.0 -1.50% -1.10%*** -1.22% 0.66% -3.09%***
Buy PF 4,452 199.9 2.03%*** 0.63%*** 0.26% -0.25% 1.05%***
Sell PF 4,203 174.8 0.46% -0.14% -0.28% -0.24% -2.07%***
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Table 2.6: (continued) 
Panel B: Differences in Return 
Rec ΔNo. ΔHolding ΔTotal Hold. ΔInitial Three ΔIntermediate ΔReturn around ΔReturn 
Category of Rec Days Period Return Days Return Earn. Report First Day 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Able Analysts – Unable Analysts 
Strong Buy -7,001 -53.1 1.55%*** -0.09% 1.32%** 0.20%* 0.17%***
Buy -9,246 -51.4 1.82%*** 0.01% 1.60%*** 0.17% 0.21%***
Hold -11,494 -53.3 1.36%*** 0.10%** 1.19%*** 0.09% 0.20%***
Sell -1,391 -57.2 0.32% 0.15% 0.19% 0.13% 0.16% 
Strong Sell -584 -39.3 -0.75% 0.21% -0.95% -0.24% -0.01% 
Buy PF -14,885 -34.8 1.29%*** -0.02% 1.43%*** 0.24**% 0.25%***
Sell PF -13,355 -35.7 1.73%*** 0.07% 1.59%*** 0.15% 0.12%***
Able Analysts – Lucky Analysts (1-year track record) 
Strong Buy 8,420 -120.1 1.73%** -0.11% 1.48%** 0.29%* 0.07% 
Buy 10,310 -102.1 1.27%** -0.14%** 1.31%** 0.11% 0.12%* 
Hold 15,174 -81.7 0.18% -0.03% 0.14% -0.07% 0.36%***
Sell 1,748 -85.2 0.40% 0.11% 0.70% -0.29% 0.49%***
Strong Sell 1,049 -95.5 -1.74% 0.36% -1.53% -0.98%** 0.80%***
Buy PF 17,162 -88.9 1.36%** 0.24%** 0.85% 0.61%*** 0.09% 
Sell PF 17,073 -59.5 1.11%* 0.27%** 0.69% 0.30% 0.69%***
 
Table 2.6 shows the results for the recommendation levels (i.e., “Strong Buy” to “Strong 
Sell”) as well as for upgrades and downgrades according to the portfolio definitions of 
Cohen, Frazzini, and Malloy (2010). With respect to the recommendation levels the results in 
Panel A show that able analysts issue profitable recommendations for all recommendation 
categories if the recommendations are held from the trading day after the announcement until 
three trading days after the report date. “Strong Buy”, “Buy”, and “Hold” recommendations 
earn positive excess returns, while “Sell” and “Strong Sell” recommendations earn negative 
excess returns. In contrast, “Strong Buy”, “Buy”, and “Hold” recommendations by unable or 
lucky analysts do not yield excess returns. “Sell” and “Strong Sell” recommendations by 
unable analysts also yield negative excess returns. Lucky analysts do not issue 
recommendations in any category that are profitable. The differences in excess returns 
between analysts are shown in Table 2.6 Panel B: “Strong Buy” recommendations of able 
analysts earn 1.55% (1.73%) more excess return than “Strong Buy” recommendations of 
unable (lucky) analysts. The differences in returns cannot be attributed to differences in the 
holding period, since the length of the holding period is even significantly lower for the able 
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analysts’ recommendations. Also, “Buy” recommendations of able analysts are 1.82% 
(1.27%) more profitable than those of unable (lucky) analyst. The “Hold” recommendations 
of able analysts outperform those of unable analysts by 1.36%. For the “Sell” and “Strong 
Sell” recommendations there is no significant difference in returns between able and unable, 
respectively able and lucky analysts. The findings are in line with the results of the trading 
strategy: Able analysts issue significantly more profitable recommendations, but only in the 
upper recommendation categories. 
Panel A also shows that across all analysts the excess return on the recommendation 
announcement day is economically significant. The average absolute announcement day 
return over all categories and analysts is about 1.4%. Panel B, however, points out that there 
is no economically significant difference in return on the announcement day across all 
recommendation categories between able and unable or able and lucky analysts. 
Recommendations from able analysts do not have a stronger market impact on the 
recommendation announcement day in terms of an economically significantly higher return. 
Similarly, the cumulative excess return on the three trading days following the announcement 
day shows that in general there is a post-announcement drift, i.e., the stock return follows the 
direction of the announcement day. For example, the average “Strong Buy” recommendation 
of an able analyst generates 0.34% of excess return on the three trading days following the 
announcement day. However, the results in Panel B also show that there is no economically 
significant difference in excess return between able, unable, and lucky analysts on the first 
three trading days after the announcement day. This finding indicates that the differences in 
excess returns in the total holding period are in general not due to a reputation effect, i.e., 
market participants do not just blindly follow able analysts whatever they recommend.  
The majority of the return difference of the “Strong Buy” and “Buy” recommendations is 
realized over a longer time window, i.e., in the intermediate time period, indicating that able 
analysts have stock picking ability. One plausible explanation is that the “Strong Buy” and 
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“Buy” recommendations of able analysts earn higher returns, because able analysts anticipate 
the trend of the underlying stock due to their better knowledge of future earnings. 
Interestingly, the return difference around the earnings report date is relatively small. This 
indicates that investors anticipate positive or negative earnings news before the release. 
 Overall, the results show that able analysts are superior to unable and lucky analysts in 
identifying undervalued stocks, as indicated by the higher performance of the “Strong Buy” 
and “Buy” recommendations. The higher excess returns, however, are not generated in the 
first trading days after the recommendation announcement, but rather over a longer time 
window. The higher returns of “Strong Buy” and “Buy” recommendations are in line with the 
results of the long portfolio of the trading strategy. A noticeably difference are the returns of 
the lower recommendation categories, e.g., we find excess returns for “Sell” 
recommendations of able analysts. As a reminder we do not find excess returns for the short 
portfolio of the trading strategy. This difference can be attributed to using an event-study 
approach instead of a calendar-time approach, using equally-weighted returns instead of 
value-weighted returns, and using DGTW excess returns instead of Fama and French excess 
returns. Taking into account both the results from the event-study and the trading strategy 
shows that “Sell” and “Strong Sell” recommendations might earn excess returns when using 
an event-study, but not when using a calendar-time approach which mimics an investor 
following the recommendations. In contrast, “Strong Buy” and “Buy” recommendations are 
also profitable when using a calendar-time approach with value-weighting. 
Table 2.6 also shows the results of the event study when using the “Buy portfolio” and “Sell 
portfolio” definitions of Cohen, Frazzini, and Malloy (2010). The mean return of 
recommendations from able analysts assigned to the “Buy porfolio” is 1.29% higher in 
comparison to unable analysts when holding the recommendations until they are revised or 
until the earnings for the underlying stock are announced plus three trading days (again, the 
returns are not annualized). The return difference between able and lucky analysts is 1.36%. 
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Recommendations assigned to the “Sell porfolio” of unable analysts earn significantly lower 
returns than recommendations by able analysts. This result is driven mainly by the 
significantly lower return of “Hold” recommendations from unable analysts (as shown in 
Table 2.6). The direction of the return, however, is not in line with the recommendation to 
hold the stock, i.e., the excess return can only be generated when short-selling instead of 
holding the underlying stock. 
2.4.3 Differences in Ex Post Realized Accuracy  
A crucial question is whether able analysts also issue more accurate annual earnings 
forecasts, i.e., whether the ex ante classification of analysts translates into a higher ex post 
realized earnings accuracy. The results for the earnings accuracy of the last forecast issued by 
the analyst in the fiscal year are shown in Table 2.7. We find that the absolute forecast error 
scaled by price (AFEP) and the standardized ACCURACY increase monotonously from Q5 
to Q1. Overall, our findings suggest that able analysts have a significant advantage in 
predicting earnings. Their forecast error is about 50% lower. The AFEP of able analysts is 
0.91%, while the AFEP of unable and lucky analysts is 2.02% and 1.97%, respectively. The 
high past earnings accuracy of lucky analysts does not translate into higher future forecast 
accuracy. In terms of absolute dollar values able analysts are about $0.21 more accurate 
based on a median stock price of $21 in our sample. Assuming an average Price-to-Earnings 
ratio of 10, this advantage would translate into a firm valuation that is about 9% more 
accurate ([10-$21/($2.1+$0.21)]/10). The results imply that the lower forecast errors of able 
analysts translate into superior firm valuations and in turn into more profitable stock 
recommendations. Superior knowledge of company fundamentals also yields value-adding 
investment advice. 
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Table 2.7: Differences in Ex Post Realized Earnings Accuracy 
This table shows the ex post realized accuracy for analysts that are ex ante classified according to IFULL and the 
one-year ITRACK information set. The table reports the absolute forecast error (AFE) scaled by price in % and the 
standardized earnings accuracy variable ACCURACY. Panel A shows the results according to information set 
IFULL. Panel B shows the results for the analysts that belong to the upper two quintiles according to ITRACK which 
are independently sorted according to information set IFULL. Significance levels are indicated as follows: *** 1% 
significance, ** 5% significance, * 10% significance.  
Panel A: Ex Post Accuracy Quintiles according to Information Set IFULL 
 
Able (Q5) Q4 Q3 Q2 Unable (Q1) Q5 - Q1 
AFE scaled by Price (%)           
Mean 0.91% 1.00% 1.19% 1.44% 2.02% -1.10%***
Median 0.20% 0.20% 0.26% 0.34% 0.56% 
Minimum 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
Maximum 24.95% 25.00% 24.96% 24.89% 25.00% 
ACCURACY 
Mean 0.80 0.78 0.74 0.69 0.60 0.20***
Median 0.93 0.91 0.88 0.84 0.72 
Minimum 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Maximum 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00  
       
Panel B: Ex Post Accuracy Quintiles according to Information Set ITRACK (1 year) 
Q5 Q4 Q3 Q2 Lucky (Q1) Q5 - Q1 
AFE scaled by Price (%)             
Mean 0.88% 0.96% 1.24% 1.46% 1.97% -0.93%***
Median 0.20% 0.19% 0.24% 0.32% 0.48% 
Minimum 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
Maximum 24.50% 25.00% 24.70% 24.89% 24.84% 
ACCURACY 
Mean 0.81 0.79 0.75 0.70 0.66 0.16***
Median 0.93 0.92 0.89 0.86 0.82 
Minimum 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Maximum 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00   
 
 
The values of the forecast errors and the difference in forecast errors between the upper and 
the lower quintile are in line with the results of Loh and Mian (2006). In their study, when 
differentiating between analysts based on ex-post realized earnings accuracy, analysts in the 
most accurate quintile have an AFEP of 0.756%, while analysts in the least accurate quintile 
have an AFEP of 2.199%. This implies that our ex-ante classification of analysts works 
remarkably well, since the forecast errors are only slightly higher (lower) for the able 
(unable) analysts. Contrary to Brown (2001) and Brown and Mohd (2003) we find that 
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analyst characteristics can be used to identify economically significant more accurate 
earnings forecasters out-of-sample. 
2.5 Conclusion 
We find a pronounced heterogeneity in the information processing abilities of analysts that 
can be identified ex ante. Able analysts add value in the investment decision process. In 
contrast, unable analysts’ recommendations are generally not worth following. Our results 
imply that certain analysts have the ability to discriminate between over- and undervalued 
stocks. Therefore it pays for investors to filter out the superior investment advice from the 
large number of recommendations provided by analysts. Differentiating between able and 
unable analysts is challenging, because there are lucky analysts, i.e., analysts that seem to be 
able just because they delivered a good result last year, while in fact they are not. Our 
approach enables us to look beyond the track record of an analyst, since we do not base our 
assessment on historical performance alone, but also on the skills and working environment. 
Our findings contribute to previous literature on analyst career concerns. We find that track 
records on a stand-alone basis are not applicable in order to reduce information asymmetries 
in principal-agent relationships, since they can be heavily influenced by lucky outcomes. We 
find that judging analysts on past outcomes alone leads to suboptimal investment decisions 
by investors and to unjustified promotion and demotion decisions by employers.  
More generally, our results allow for conjectures concerning the broad literature of 
performance and compensation evaluation, e.g., for mutual funds or CEOs. Identifying the 
more skilled information processors provides a promising approach for other fields of 
research, in particular, if their results depend on the quality of analysts’ forecasts, e.g., studies 
using analysts’ outputs to capture the expectations of market participants. Furthermore, 
equity valuation models based on discounted expected cash flows or (residual) earnings, or 
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estimates of intrinsic cost of capital could profit from using only the forecasts of (ex ante 
identifiable) superior information processors. 
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Chapter 3 – Sell Side Recommendations during Booms and Busts 
3.1 Introduction  
The importance of the business cycle for information processing on capital markets has been 
pointed out by several studies: For example, Veronesi (1999) shows that the reaction of prices 
to news tends to be stronger in good economic times than in bad economic times. Boyd, Hu, 
and Jagannathan (2005) and Beber and Brandt (2010) find that investors process the same 
information differently depending on the business cycle. One of the main information sources 
for equity investors are sell side analysts who provide recommendations for the covered 
stocks. Changes in stock recommendations are on average associated with significant stock 
price reactions. In this paper, we analyze the relationship between analysts’ stock 
recommendations and general macroeconomic conditions. To the best of our knowledge we 
are the first to study this link.  
Related research has studied the performance of stock recommendations during the Dot-com 
bubble in 2000 and 2001 (Barber et al. (2003)). However, economic fluctuations are not 
necessarily convergent to movements on equity markets. For example, there is a negative 
correlation between per capita GDP growth and real equity returns in the 1900-2002 time 
period (Ritter (2005)). Furthermore, bull and bear markets are to some extent arbitrary 
demarcations whereas expansions and recessions are marked “officially” by economic dating 
committees (e.g., the National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)) or economic activity 
indices (e.g., the Chicago Fed National Activity Index (CFNAI)). 
It appears reasonable to assume that the work of stock analysts is affected by economic 
conditions. In their role as market intermediaries financial analysts gather, analyze, and 
disseminate information which investors regard as a valuable allocation advice. Such advice 
comprises a comparison of the current and the expected market valuation of a firm and 
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culminates in a stock recommendation that informs investors about potential mispricings. 
Today’s forecast of tomorrow’s price depends, among other factors, on the expected earnings 
(respectively cash flows) and the cost of capital. As capital markets and the real economy are 
closely interlinked, both, corporate earnings and interest rates are affected by aggregate 
economic fluctuations. An economic slowdown usually impairs the company’s value, e.g., 
when expected growth rates are lowered. Changed company outlooks demand adjustments in 
valuation which must also lead to revised recommendations.  
We analyze stock recommendations against the backdrop of general economic activity. We 
address two main research questions: First, we analyze the performance of sell side 
recommendations over the business cycle, i.e., whether there is a difference in stock 
recommendation profitability between recessions and expansions? Stock returns and the 
business cycle are linked, for example, Chordia and Shivakumar (2002) find that momentum 
strategies earn positive returns in expansions, but negative returns in recessions. Second, we 
analyze the characteristics of the stocks that are recommended by analysts: For example, do 
analysts recommend stocks with similar characteristics over the business cycle? Or do they 
have preferences for, e.g., “value” stocks in recessions and “glamour” stocks in expansions?  
First, we show that recommendations affect stock prices differently contingent on the business 
cycle. The initial price impact is significantly stronger in recessions.10 For example, an 
upgraded stock yields excess returns of 2.41% in the first three trading days after 
recommendation issuance during an expansion, but 3.45% in a recession. The difference of 
1.05% is both statistically and economically significant. Also, downgraded stocks yield 
excess returns of -2.34% in the first three trading days after recommendations issuance during 
                                                     
10 We calculate excess returns according to Daniel, Grinblatt, Titman, and Wermers (1997). Stocks are matched 
in terms of size, market-to-book ratios, and one-year momentum and are divided in 125 portfolios. Therefore, 
excess returns indicate an outperformance over the peer-group of stocks with similar characteristics. 
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an expansion, but -4.42% in a recession. This difference of -1.26% is statistically and 
economically significant as well. 
Interestingly, analyzing the price reaction of recommended stocks over a longer time horizon 
reveals a different picture: In recession, “Buy”11 recommendations generate negative excess 
returns during the 6-month window12 after recommendation issuance. Hence, these “Buy” 
recommendations have no long-term investment value in recessions, i.e., investors would be 
better off to sell the recommended stocks after the recommendation announcement day. In 
expansions, we find that “Buy” recommendations have positive long-term investment value. 
After the initial positive price reaction, the recommended stocks generate positive excess 
returns. We also find that the market reaction is in line with the recommendation in both 
expansions and recessions for “Sell” recommendations, i.e., the stocks underperform their 
peer-group.  
Second, we analyze the characteristics of the recommended stocks. We show that analysts’ 
preferences towards the recommended firms are consistent over the business cycle, since 
analysts favor “glamour” over “value” stocks in both expansions and recessions. The 
documented bias in analysts’ recommendations for “glamour” stocks (Jegadeesh et al. (2004)) 
is sustained in recessions. However, the underlying economic rationale for this bias is 
questionable, since e.g., Lakonishok, Shleifer, and Vishny (1994) show that returns of growth 
stocks are lower in comparison to those of value stocks in recessions. 
Our results are robust in the post Regulation Fair Disclosure (Reg FD) time period, to the 
business cycle classification according to both NBER and CFNAI, and to mean and median 
returns. Also, our results are not driven by analyst herding.  
                                                     
11 We follow Cohen, Frazzini, and Malloy (2010) in the classification of recommendations. The “Buy” portfolio 
consists of all upgraded stocks and stocks for which the analyst initiates, resumes or reiterates her coverage with 
a “Strong Buy or “Buy” recommendation. 
12 The post-recommendation drift lasts up to six months (Womack (1996)).  
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Prior research on the relation between business cycle on analysts is limited. Welch (2000) 
documents increased recommendation herding for bullish markets but not for contracting 
markets. Richards, Benjamin, and Strawser (1977) and Richardson, Teoh, and Wysocki 
(1999) show that EPS forecasts issued during booms tend to be overly optimistic while 
forecasts issued during busts are less optimistic. Lee, O’Brien, and Sivaramakrishnan (2008) 
observe a similar pattern in five-year earnings growth forecasts, Dhole, Mishra, and 
Sivaramakrishnan (2010) in managers’ outlooks and Spiwoks, Gubaydullina, and Hein (2011) 
in interest rate forecasts. As a counterexample, Dreman, and Berry (1995) study EPS forecasts 
but do not find any differences in optimism between expansions and recessions. As far as firm 
characteristics are concerned, research has so far solely focused on stock market trends and 
the extent to which they influence analysts' recommendations. Barber et al. (2003) find that 
analysts keep favoring growth stocks despite their poor performance during stock market 
busts.  
Overall, our study documents that controlling for business cycle effects is important when 
analyzing financial analysts. Our results indicate that the information content and the 
information processing of stock recommendations differ fundamentally between expansions 
and recessions. Investors react significantly stronger to all recommendations in recessions, 
i.e., the price impact of stock recommendations is significantly higher in recessions. However, 
while “Sell” recommendations issued in recessions generate negative excess returns over a 
longer time window, “Buy” recommendations do not have long-term investment value in 
recessions. These results point out that in recessions analysts are generally too optimistic with 
regard to the stocks they recommend as a “Buy”. Analysts favor “glamour” stocks during 
recessions and expansions. But these recommended “glamour” stocks are worth following 
only in expansions. At the same time investors strongly overreact to the positively 
recommended stocks in recessions, indicating that investors overestimate the investment value 
of “Buy” recommendations in economic downturns.  
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The remainder of this paper is structured as follows: Section 3.2 describes the data, section 
3.3 describes the research approach and the results, section 3.4 presents various robustness 
checks and finally, section 3.5 concludes. 
3.2 Data 
Analyst recommendations are obtained from the Institutional Brokers' Estimate System 
(I/B/E/S) database. Our sample includes observations from January 1994 to December 2010. 
Stock data are obtained from the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) database. 
Company financial data are retrieved from the Compustat database. The total data sample 
captures two recessions of unequal duration and severity and three expansions. Recessions 
account for a smaller fraction of the sample time. The total duration of expansions is 173 
months compared to only 26 months of recession. Resulting from that, the combined 
expansion panel contains approximately 390,000 observations compared to 60,000 in 
recessions. 
Table 3.1: Distribution of Recommendations 
This table presents the combined distribution of initial recommendations and revisions thereof as obtained from 
the I/B/E/S database from January 1994 until December 2010. Relative frequencies refer to the distribution of 
recommendations within the respective time frame. The consensus is calculated as the arithmetic mean of all 
recommendations under the standard classification in which a strong buy recommendation is coded as "1", buy
as "2" etc. 
        
  Exp. Rec. Exp. Rec. Exp. Total 
Exp. 
Total 
Rec. 
Total 
Sample Start/End 01/1994 
 
02/2001 
03/2001 
 
11/2001 
12/2001
 
11/2007 
12/2007
 
06/2009 
07/2009
 
12/2010 
Duration (months) 85 8 71 18 15 171 26 197 
N (observations) 189,609 16,927 164,221 43,287 36,772 390,602 60,214 450,816 
Rel. Frequency (%) 
(1) Strong Buy 29.67 25.41 20.02 19.00 22.12 24.86 20.95 24.36
(2) Buy 36.00 37.56 26.54 23.13 26.13 31.11 27.02 30.59
(3) Hold 30.89 34.23 44.06 46.25 43.48 37.64 42.84 38.31
(4) Sell 1.83 1.77 6.51 7.25 5.55 4.15 5.73 4.36
(5) Strong Sell 1.61 1.04 2.87 4.38 2.55 2.23 3.46 2.39 
Consensus 2.10 2.15 2.46 2.55 2.40 2.28 2.44 2.30 
(The distinction of recessions and expansions is based on the NBER statistics.) 
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The two most prominent business cycle classification schemes are the demarcations of 
expansions and recessions by the National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)13 and the 
Chicago Fed National Activity Index (CFNAI).14 Both classifications are used in this study.15 
Unlike other classification schemes, the NBER does not employ simplistic rules such as two 
quarters of declining GDP in a row to mark recessions. Instead they follow their less formal 
definition of a recession as a “significant decline in economic activity spread across the 
economy, lasting more than a few months, normally visible in real GDP, real income, 
employment, industrial production, and wholesale-retail sales” (National Bureau of Economic 
Research (2011)). It is important to note that the NBER is not available in real time, i.e., the 
business cycle classification is determined with a (substantial) time lag. Additionally, the 
three months moving average of the CFNAI is employed for robustness checks. Published 
with a smaller time lag and based on formal quantitative rules about coincident economic 
activity, it is available as more recent information for decision making. It comprises 85 
monthly indicators of national economic activity from the fields of production and income; 
employment, unemployment, and hours; personal consumption and housing; and sales, orders, 
and inventories. The index is constructed in such a way that it has a mean value of zero with a 
standard deviation equal to one. This construction is straightforward in the way that a positive 
value corresponds to growth above trend and vice versa. 
The divergent approach of both indices becomes apparent in Figure 3.1 which displays the 
official NBER dated recessions and the course of the three months moving average CFNAI. 
The CFNAI has two important thresholds for the determination of recessions: First, the 
likelihood that a recession has begun increases if the index falls below -0.7 after a period of 
                                                     
13 The NBER classification is retrieved from the NBER site http://www.nber.org/cycles.html.  
14 The CFNAI is retrieved from the Federal Reserve of Chicago 
http://www.chicagofed.org/webpages/research/data/cfnai/current_data.cfm.  
15 The NBER classification is used as the default classification. The results for the CFNAI classification are 
discussed in section 3.4 (Table 3.8).  
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economic expansion. Second, the likelihood that a recession has ended increases if the index 
outperforms +0.2 after a period of economic contraction. 
Figure 3.1: Comparison of NBER and CFNAI Dated Recessions 
This figure displays the three months moving average CFNAI in its continuous classification as well as in the 
binary (0/1) version, whereby 0 stands for expansion and 1 for recession. The latter one can be directly compared 
to the NBER classification. The horizontal bars pertain to the left vertical axis and display the +0.2 and -0.7 
point thresholds. 
 
 
As it can be seen in Figure 3.1, the CFNAI was able to detect both recessions which have 
occurred in the time between 1994 and 2010. Coming from an expansion, this is indicated by 
the index falling below the -0.7 threshold which in turn sets the binary CFNAI to the value of 
1. This fact needs to be considered in the context of the release time. Although the actual 
dates of the beginnings and endings of recessions are published with a substantial delay by the 
NBER committee, the CFNAI provides a good early warning system. However, the CFNAI 
has a broader definition of recessions in comparison to the NBER which leads to marked 
recessions that are larger. Both CFNAI dated recessions, starting in 2001 and in late 2008, 
account for more than twice the time span indicated by the NBER recessions. 
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3.3 Research Design & Results 
3.3.1 Event Returns and the Price Formation Process 
We conduct an event-study to analyze the profitability of recommendations depending on the 
business cycle. We calculate daily excess returns for firm i on trading day t according to 
Daniel et al. (1997) (“DGTW”) as shown in Equation 3.1. From each stock’s raw return we 
subtract the return on a value-weighted portfolio of all CRSP firms in the same size, 
(industry-adjusted) market-to-book ratio, and one-year momentum quintile. We use the Fama 
and French 48-industry classification and update the 125 characteristic portfolios at the end of 
July of each year. A positive DGTW excess return implies an outperformance over stocks in 
the peer-group with similar size, market-to-book, and one-year momentum characteristics.  
(3.1) 
We analyze the DGTW excess returns on the recommendation announcement day (“0”), in 
the first four trading days (“0–3”), in the first month, in the first three months, and up to six 
months. If a recommendation is revised, we drop the stock from our portfolio after holding it 
one additional trading day. The cumulative adjusted returns (CAR) are calculated for the 
event windows specified below: 
(3.2) 
There is evidence that stocks already move before the recommendation is officially 
announced (Stickel (1995)). However, the general idea of correctly using stock 
recommendations implies that one’s observation period starts with the official publication 
date, hence we use t = 0. Moreover, the fraction of price change that occurs before the 
recommendation publication is rather small. We use t up to 6 months / 126 trading days as 
Womack (1996) finds related market reactions for up to that period. 
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We focus on recommendation changes rather than recommendation levels, since changes have 
higher predictive power for subsequent price changes than levels (e.g., Jegadeesh et al. 
(2004)). Recommendations are assigned to either a “Buy” portfolio or “Sell” portfolio as 
outlined by Cohen, Frazzini, and Malloy (2010). The “Buy” portfolio consists of all upgraded 
stocks and stocks for which the analyst initiates, resumes or reiterates the coverage with a 
“Strong Buy” or “Buy” recommendation. The “Sell” portfolio consists of all downgraded 
stocks and stocks for which the analyst initiates, resumes or reiterates the coverage with a 
“Hold”, “Sell” or “Strong Sell” recommendation. Furthermore, in accordance with Cohen, 
Frazzini, and Malloy (2010) we analyze the performance of upgraded and downgraded stocks 
separately. 
The recommendations are defined according to recessions and expansions by the business 
cycle stage at which they are announced, i.e., a recommendation which is issued during the 
last month of a recession is considered to belong to the recession. After calculating excess 
returns for recommendations issued in expansions and recommendations issued in recessions 
we compare the two to assess differences. 
Figure 3.2 and Figure 3.3 display differences in the initial market reaction to the 
recommendations announcement and in the subsequent price formation pattern between 
expansions and recessions. The numeric results are shown in Table 3.2. Figure 3.2 shows that 
stocks in the “Buy” portfolio have a significant stronger market impact in recessions than in 
expansions. The difference is 0.67% in the first four trading days (“0–3”) including the 
recommendation announcement day. Figure 3.3 shows that for the subsample of upgraded 
stocks the difference is with 1.05% even larger. Also, the stock market reaction to 
recommendations in the “Sell” portfolio respectively downgraded stocks is significantly 
stronger in recession: Stocks in the “Sell” portfolio underperform their DGTW peer group by 
-0.9% in the first four trading days, while downgraded stocks underperform by -1.26%. 
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Overall, the initial stock market reaction to analysts’ recommendations is significantly 
stronger in recessions in all analyzed recommendation categories. This difference is both 
statistically and economically significant. 
Figure 3.2: Event Study: Buy and Sell Portfolio in Expansion and Recession (NBER) 
This figure shows the cumulated excess returns from the recommendation announcement day up to 126 trading 
days, i.e., 6 calendar months, later. The ordinate indicates the DGTW (1997) excess return. The abscissa 
indicates days elapsed since the recommendation was announced with written trading day values. The sample 
period is from January 1994 to December 2010 using revisions announced during NBER-designated expansions 
(EXP) and recessions (REC). The individual curves stand for the performance of the Buy and the Short portfolio 
in expansions and recessions.  
 
However, the reaction over a longer horizon, i.e., the price formation pattern, is different for 
the “Buy” portfolio and the “Sell” portfolio respectively for the subsample of upgraded and 
downgraded stocks: In a recession stocks in the “Sell” portfolio follow the initial market 
reaction, i.e., stocks generate negative excess returns. In line with the initial market reaction, 
the market reaction over the following 6 months is stronger in recessions. For example, stocks 
in the “Sell” portfolio generate an additional negative excess return of -2.83% in a recession 
in comparison to -2.02% in expansions after the recommendation announcement day. This 
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indicates that “Sell” recommendations have higher investment value in recessions in 
comparison to expansions.  
Figure 3.3: Event Study: Upgrades and Downgrades Portfolio in Expansion and 
Recession (NBER) 
This figure shows the cumulated excess returns from the recommendation announcement day up to 126 trading 
days, i.e., 6 calendar months, later. The ordinate indicates the DGTW (1997) excess return. The abscissa 
indicates days elapsed since the recommendation was announced with written trading day values. The sample 
period is from January 1994 to December 2010 using revisions announced during NBER-designated expansions 
(EXP) and recessions (REC). The individual curves stand for the performance of the Upgrade and the 
Downgrade portfolio in expansions and recessions.  
 
In contrast, stocks in the “Buy” portfolio generate positive excess returns of 0.38% over six 
month after recommendation issuance excluding the recommendation announcement day in 
an expansion, but negative excess returns of -1.60% in recessions. This return difference of 
1.98% is similar for upgraded stocks. Our results indicate that recommended stocks have a 
positive long-term investment value over six months in expansions, but a negative one in 
recessions. Investors would be better off to sell the recommended stocks in recessions after 
the announcement day, indicating that investors overreact in their initial market reaction. 
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Table 3.2: Event Study: Excess returns according to DGTW (1997) (NBER) 
This table presents the results of the event-study for the total sample period 01/1994–12/2010. The event-returns 
are shown for expansions and recessions according to the NBER classification. The excess returns are calculated 
according to DGTW (1997). The portfolio classifications follow Cohen, Frazzini, and Malloy (2010). The “Buy 
portfolio” consists of all upgraded stocks and stocks for which the analyst initiates, resumes or reiterates the 
coverage with a “Strong Buy or “Buy” recommendation. The “Sell portfolio” consists of all downgraded stocks 
and stocks for which the analyst initiates, resumes or reiterates the coverage with a “Hold”, “Sell” or “Strong 
Sell” recommendation. The upgraded and downgraded stocks are shown separately. The excess returns are 
shown for the announcement day (Day “0”), the first 3 trading days, 1 month, 3 months, 6 months and 6 months 
excluding the announcement day. If recommendations are revised during the holding period, the stocks remain in 
the portfolio till the revision plus one trading day. A t-test is performed to evaluate whether the excess returns 
are significantly different from zero. *, ** and *** indicate significance at the 10, 5 and 1%-level, respectively.  
Trading days 
 
Sample 
        
Recommendation Classification (Mean Returns) 
NBER Buy-PF Sell-PF Upgrade Downgrade 
0           
  Exp 1.24%*** -1.51%*** 2.13%*** -2.34%*** 
  Rec 1.83%*** -1.93%*** 3.11%*** -2.89%*** 
  Rec-Exp 0.60%*** -0.42%*** 0.98%*** -0.55%*** 
0 - 3           
  Exp 1.41%*** -2.12%*** 2.41%*** -3.16%*** 
  Rec 2.08%*** -3.03%*** 3.45%*** -4.42%*** 
  Rec-Exp 0.67%*** -0.90%*** 1.05%*** -1.26%*** 
1 month           
  Exp 1.28%*** -2.37%*** 2.53%*** -3.65%*** 
  Rec 1.59%*** -3.03%*** 3.38%*** -4.58%*** 
  Rec-Exp 0.31%** -0.65%*** 0.85%*** -0.93%*** 
3 months           
  Exp 1.53%*** -3.07%*** 2.82%*** -4.43%*** 
  Rec 1.48%*** -3.86%*** 3.48%*** -5.47%*** 
  Rec-Exp -0.05% -0.79%*** 0.66%** -1.04%*** 
6 months           
  Exp 1.62%*** -3.74%*** 3.05%*** -5.26%*** 
  Rec 0.20% -5.03%*** 2.02%*** -6.75%*** 
  Rec-Exp -1.42%*** -1.29%*** -1.03%*** -1.49%*** 
6 months (ex Day 0)           
Exp 0.38%*** -2.02%*** 0.92%*** -2.63%*** 
Rec -1.60%*** -2.83%*** -1.00%** -3.38%*** 
  Rec-Exp -1.98%*** -0.81%*** -1.92%*** -0.75%** 
(The distinction of recessions and expansions is based on the NBER statistics.) 
Overall, our results point out that the information content and the stock market reaction to the 
recommendations is very different in respect to the business cycle. In recessions, the initial 
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market reaction is significantly stronger for both the “Buy” and the “Sell” portfolio. However, 
the stronger reaction is only in line with the long-term investment value of the 
recommendations for the “Sell” portfolio. Stocks in the “Buy” portfolio generate negative 
excess returns after the recommendation announcement day over six months. This finding 
indicates that investors overreact to positive recommendations in recessions, since in fact 
analysts overestimate the long-term performance of the stocks. Stocks that are recommended 
to buy during recessions perform very poorly in the long run, i.e., they do not generate excess 
returns. This finding points out that analysts are positively biased in terms of the expected 
performance of “Buy” recommendations during recessions.  
3.3.2 Analyst Preferences Towards Firms 
Next, we analyze whether analysts change their preferences toward firm characteristics 
dependent on the business cycle. For example, do analysts favor growth stocks in expansions 
and value stocks in recessions or are they consistent in their preferences? Economic 
fluctuations impact corporate earnings, cash flows and therefore valuations. Hence, we expect 
rational analysts to alter their recommendations according to the business cycle not only in 
such a way that they issue less optimistic recommendations, but that they also align to 
preferable stock and company characteristics. We expect revisions to reflect the adaptive 
ability of analysts the most, because revisions are richer in new data and have shown to add 
more value to investment decisions (Jegadeesh et al. (2004)). 
Economic fluctuations affect the expectations of market participants about firms’ earnings and 
the business climate in general. As firms differ on various dimensions, we also suspect 
expectations of investors and financial analysts to be subject to changing conditions. 
Important distinguishing factors among others are: the size and industry affiliation of a firm, 
the current market valuation in comparison to book earnings or valuation, and the past success 
and growth of a company.  
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The methodology of our analysis is based on the following research questions to gain insight 
into the sources of the predictive power of financial analysts and about potential biases and 
their consequences for investors. 
(I) What preferences for company characteristics are revealed through stock 
 recommendations? 
(II) Do analysts change their preferences contingent on the business cycle? 
(III) Are the preference structure and its alteration in line with empirical research about the 
relation between firm characteristics and future excess returns? 
A straight–forward way to detect what stock characteristics analysts favor consists in the 
calculation of means (or medians) of particular financial figures, e.g., the market 
capitalization (as a proxy for the size) and a subsequent comparison across business cycles. 
However, this approach does not enable precise comparisons of absolute figures. Both 
recessions occur in the second half of the sample. Between 1994 and 2010 stock prices (and 
thereby market capitalizations) have increased substantially. Hence, despite the sharp decline 
in prices during recessions, average values are still higher than during the relatively big time–
span of expansion before. 
Table 3.3: Company Financials across Business Cycles 
This table displays financial data of firms across expansions and recessions according to the recommendation 
category. Values are calculated on the basis of data which was winsorized at the top and bottom quintiles. Prices 
are obtained from the CRSP database on a daily basis. The market capitalization of firms is calculated as the 
number of shares outstanding multiplied by the share price (in thousand USD). The definitions of ratios are 
given in the body of this chapter. 
      
N Price ($) Market Cap. ($) MB PE 
  Exp. Rec. Exp. Rec. Exp. Rec. Exp. Rec. Exp. Rec. 
(1) Strong Buy   97,667 12,134 35.41 52.71 4,260,457 5,371,954 3.49 3.01 17.59 13.69 
(2) Buy 122,244 15,652 36.38 39.44 4,643,797 5,674,206 3.42 3.07 17.23 13.97
(3) Hold 147,899 24,815 40.25 41.55 4,717,733 4,884,081 2.96 2.52 16.24 12.65
(4) Sell 16,322 3,318 36.90 22.93 4,467,955 4,389,518 2.54 2.11 13.74 10.64
(5) Strong Sell    8,758   2,007 40.36 23.23 4,303,041 5,123,125 2.76 2.24 13.88 10.96 
Mean/Total 392,890 57,926 37.71 41.61 4,561,436 5,179,729 3.21 2.74 16.73 13.05 
(The distinction of recessions and expansions is based on the NBER statistics.) 
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However, relative metrics can be compared. As expected, we find the market-to-book and 
price-earnings ratio to be higher in times of economic expansion. On average, the market-to-
book ratio (price-earnings ratio) is 3.21 (16.73) during expansions and 2.74 (13.05) in 
recessions. These results could be expected from times of declining stock prices. Though, 
firms which receive the most favorable recommendations according to the I/B/E/S 
classification score substantially higher on these valuation multiples than those with negative 
recommendations. In expansions a “Strong Buy” recommendation averages 17.59 compared 
to 13.88 for a “Strong Sell” on the price-earnings ratio. The same pattern is found for 
recessions. It indicates a tilt towards stocks which have higher growth opportunities 
respectively stocks with a higher market valuation. Arguably, this preference is in conflict 
with capital market research which documents higher returns for stocks that score low on 
these ratios (Fama and French (1998)). 
In order to control for the general effect of the business cycle on financial metrics two 
complementary approaches are used in the following to enable a reliable line-up of firm 
characteristics across cycles: First, a comparison of decile ranks of firm fundamentals is 
employed. Table 3.3 displays the deciles of average momentum statistics to which 
recommendations and revisions pertain in order to determine the extent to which analysts 
discriminate their recommendations based on the past performance of stocks. In addition, it is 
accounted for size, value, and growth specific preferences across business cycles. The second 
approach for the investigation of analysts’ preferences, displayed in Table 3.4, deals with 
quantitative investment signals which have been subject to extensive research in the past 
indicating a nexus with future returns (see Jegadeesh et al. (2004)). The correlation between 
recommendation/revision categories and the criteria described below is investigated. 
Subsequently, if a correlation above 0.10 is found the actual is compared to the normative 
direction (of sign) of the correlation with future returns that was found in prior studies. The 
decile rank comparison and the correlation analysis are somewhat similar as to their 
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contribution to the question about the analysts’ preference structure. Though, the latter 
method gives insight to whether analysts consider and align their recommendations to 
commonly accepted investment signals in general and in changing economies or if they 
simply ignore them. 
The stock characteristics ratios used for this study are defined in the following. For all 
definitions listed subsequently q, m, d are defined as the quarter, month, or day of a 
recommendation/revision announcement for the firm i. Company financial data pertains to the 
end of the respective quarter, whereas prices pertain to the day on which a recommendation is 
published. 
Sales growth is calculated as the rolling sum of sales for the preceding two and four quarters: 
 
1
q-i
i=0
1
q-2-i
i=0
Sales
SG2=
Sales
å
å  (3.3) 
The market-to-book ratio is calculated as the market value of a stock over the book value of 
common equity: 
 
d d
q
Price ×Shares outstanding
MB=
Book value of common equity
 ሺ3.4ሻ 
The price-earnings ratio is computed as the price of the stock divided by the rolling sum of the 
EPS for the preceding four quarters ( qEPS = Earnings per share before extraordinary items): 
 
d
3
q-i
i=0
Price
PE=
EPSå  (3.5) 
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The price momentum for the periods of 3, 6, 12, and 18 months is calculated as the product of 
monthly stock returns less the product of the monthly returns on the CRSP Value Weighted 
Index. 
 
m-1
m im-18
m-1 CRSP-VW
m-18
PM18 ={[ (1+monthly return )]-1}
            -{[ (1+monthly return )]-1}

  (3.6) 
The size of a firm is calculated as the natural logarithm of the market capitalization. 
 d d
SIZE=ln (Price ×Shares outstanding )  (3.7) 
In short, our empirical results reveal that analysts show a persistent preference for relatively 
expensive large cap growth stocks which have performed well in the past. This preference is 
significantly stronger in recessions. We discover a monotonic decrease in decile ranks on the 
3 and 18 months price momentum in recessions and expansions. Both, recommendations and 
revisions display such a pattern. In line with prior studies, this indicates that analysts favor 
stocks that have performed well in the past. However, the degree of discrimination, which is 
measured by the spread between strong buy and strong sell, is lower for the 3 months 
momentum (0.41 and 0.55) compared to the 18 months momentum (1.37 and 1.38) in both 
economic states. 
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Table 3.4: Test for Analyst Preferences 
This table displays past returns, value, growth, and size characteristics of firms for recommendations (panel A and C) and revisions (panel B and D). Average decile ranks are 
calculated for each recommendation or revision category according to the business cycle. The bottom 10% of all observations within a specific characteristic group are assigned 
the rank "1". Whereas the top 10% group receives the rank "10". Accordingly, ranks above "5" can be interpreted as exceeding the median. The bottom row of each panel table 
presents the spread between the most favorable and the most unfavorable recommendation level. It reveals the degree to which analysts discriminate their assessments. Panel A 
and B report ranks for returns during the 3 and 18 months before the recommendation announcement ("PM"). Panel C and D report ranks for the sales growth during the previous 
4 quarters before the announcement ("SG4"), the size of a firm ("SIZE"), and its market-to-book ratio at the time the recommendation was published ("MB"). All t-statistics 
pertain to the null-hypothesis that the mean respective rank is equal in expansion and recession. 
           
Panel A: Price Momentum (Recommendations) Panel C: Value, Growth, and Size (Recommendations)  
N PM3 PM18 N SG4 SIZE MB 
  Exp. Rec. Exp. Rec. t-stat Exp. Rec. t-stat Exp. Rec. Exp. Rec. t-stat Exp. Rec. t-stat Exp. Rec. t-stat 
(1) Strong Buy 91,261 11,929 5.68 5.73 -1.91 6.23 6.53 -10.94 75,201 10,564 6.19 6.39 -7.06 6.74 6.99 -10.68 6.23 6.51 -10.60 
(2) Buy 114,023 15,403 5.66 5.60 2.29 6.03 6.38 -14.27 94,069 13,864 6.09 6.33 -9.40 6.90 7.20 -14.60 6.15 6.47 -14.06 
(3) Hold 142,070 24,658 5.39 5.36 1.14 5.46 5.71 -12.86 119,050 21,981 5.74 5.95 -10.26 7.01 6.92 5.39 5.79 5.92 -7.03 
(4) Sell 16,007 3,307 5.21 5.27 -1.01 4.88 5.14 -4.79 13,610 2,901 5.36 5.49 -2.29 6.89 6.86 0.54 5.31 5.36 -0.93 
(5) Strong Sell 8,415 2,002 5.27 5.18 1.17 4.85 5.16 -4.16 6,978 1,793 5.28 5.77 -6.37 6.75 6.81 -0.97 5.42 5.48 -0.84 
Spread (1) - (5)     0.41 0.55   1.37 1.38       0.91 0.62   -0.01 0.18   0.81 1.02   
                                        
Panel B: Price Momentum (Revisions) Panel D: Value, Growth, and Size (Revisions)  
N PM3 PM18 N SG4 SIZE MB 
To ... Exp. Rec. Exp. Rec. t-stat Exp. Rec. t-stat Exp. Rec. Exp. Rec. t-stat Exp. Rec. t-stat Exp. Rec. t-stat 
(1) Strong Buy 38,946 5,843 5.60 5.79 -4.72 6.02 6.49 -11.86 33,553 5,286 5.91 6.25 -8.29 7.12 7.22 -3.07 6.19 6.49 -8.19 
(2) Buy 47,977 6,504 5.57 5.54 0.68 5.82 6.25 -11.80 41,174 5,970 5.85 6.15 -7.55 7.17 7.31 -4.60 6.02 6.34 -9.07 
(3) Hold 68,945 12,502 5.42 5.37 1.66 5.47 5.68 -7.67 59,251 11,286 5.73 5.97 -8.23 6.92 6.84 3.11 5.79 5.87 -3.00 
(4) Sell 9,537 1,978 5.24 5.31 -0.92 4.87 5.18 -4.50 8,126 1,724 5.37 5.58 -2.77 6.81 6.73 1.35 5.28 5.30 -0.36 
(5) Strong Sell 5,552 1,508 5.33 5.24 1.04 4.82 5.18 -4.26 4,712 1,380 5.20 5.72 -5.97 6.72 6.76 -0.55 5.36 5.43 -0.78 
Spread (1) - (5)     0.28 0.55   1.21 1.31       0.71 0.53   0.40 0.46   0.83 1.07   
Upgrade 77,545 12,439 5.52 5.62 -3.54 5.73 6.16 -15.62 66,520 11,266 5.66 5.95 -10.14 7.17 7.20 -1.44 5.96 6.18 -8.26 
Downgrade 93,412 15,896 5.46 5.38 3.30 5.56 5.73 -6.97 80,296 14,380 5.86 6.09 -9.07 6.90 6.87 1.38 5.86 5.94 -3.38 
(The distinction of recessions and expansions is based on the NBER statistics.) 
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Analysts seem to consider rather the longer term performance of stocks than the short term 
performance. Surprisingly, the spread statistics are slightly lower for revisions. One could 
have expected analysts to discriminate across stocks even more rigorously when changing 
their expectations which seems not to be the case. 
The overall finding for the 18 months momentum measure is that for all types of 
recommendations decile ranks are significantly higher in recessions. Stocks which are revised 
to “Strong Buy” are on average in the 6.49 decile during recessions and in the 6.02 decile in 
expansions. Analogously, “Strong Sell” revisions pertain to stocks of the 5.18 decile in 
recessions and to the 4.82 decile in expansions. Thus, the preference for high momentum 
stocks is even more pronounced during recessions. 
As far as the size of firms is concerned, we discover a general preference for larger companies 
in expansions and recessions (exceeding the 6.9 decile on average). Furthermore, analysts 
appear to take sales growth into consideration when issuing recommendations. They 
discriminate substantially across categories (e.g., 6.19 for “Strong Buy” vs. 5.28 for “Strong 
Sell” during expansions) and weigh growth stronger during recessions (6.25 vs. 5.91 for 
revisions to “Strong Buy”). Besides that, analysts favor stocks with rather high market-to-
book valuation metrics. Commonly, such stocks are popular investment choices whose prices 
are driven by the magnitude of investors. Again, this is revealed even more explicitly during 
recessions where a “Strong Buy” recommendation is located at the 6.51 decile in contrast to a 
“Sell” one at the 5.36 decile. Noticeably, there is no consistent monotonic pattern anymore as 
to the order from positive to negative recommendations and revisions. Combined with their 
favor for past winners, the analysts’ preference does not seem to be vastly different from so 
called naïve trading strategies. 
In sum, analysts reveal a preference for growth and momentum stocks and even exaggerate 
that during recessions. However, the benefit of such liking is questionable. Analysts do not 
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only favor stocks that have performed well in the past but they also exaggerate that favor 
during economically dull times. One could argue that analysts rely more heavily on 
quantitative characteristics instead of their qualitative idiosyncratic knowledge when markets 
are not in good shape. Since decile ranks are significantly different for expansions and 
recessions and persistent over time, it appears unlikely that the preference reinforcement is 
just random. 
3.3.4 Quantitative Investment Signals 
The preceding section reveals that analysts alter their preferences contingent on the business 
cycle in such a way that during recessions they amplify their likings for momentum and 
growth. The following section investigates the appropriateness of such likings. In sum, the 
preference structure of analysts and its alterations are in line with empirical research about the 
relation between firm characteristics and future excess returns as to momentum but not in the 
case of their favor for growth stocks. 
The results shown below confirm the findings of the decile comparison: The correlation 
between the price momentum variables and the absolute recommendation/revision level is 
negative which means that a high recommendation number (e.g., “Strong Sell” which is coded 
as 5 in I/B/E/S notation) by tendency is associated with a relatively low momentum and vice 
versa. On average, the 18 months price momentum reveals the strongest correlation with 
analyst recommendations. Further, the correlation is stronger in recessions (-29.03%) than 
during expansions (-16.36%). As indicated by the consistence of the normative direction and 
the actual direction, analysts' preference for past high performers is in line with empirical 
findings that prove this to coincide with future abnormal returns (the algebraic sign of the 
normative direction equals the actual direction). 
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Table 3.5: Analyst Preferences and Investment Signals 
This table presents Spearman rank correlation coefficients between the continuous explanatory variable and 
consensus analyst recommendations. In the first column five investment signals are listed (price momentum 
comprises four temporal variations, sales growth has two temporal variations). The correlation between these 
variables and the recommendations level (1) to (5) is reported in columns three and four. The normative 
direction refers to the expected algebraic sign among both as to future returns. The actual direction is derived 
from the time weighted correlation coefficient (not tabulated) across recession and expansions and reported if it 
exceeds 10%. Otherwise it is displayed as "?". *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10, 5, and 
1%-level respectively. The statistics pertain to the null-hypothesis that the mean correlation coefficient in 
expansion and recession is equal (i.e., that their difference is equal to zero). T-values are obtained via the Fisher 
r-to-z transformation. 
Explanatory 
Variable Normative Direction 
Correlation 
Actual Direction Exp. Rec. 
Price Momentum Variables 
PM18 - -16.36%*** -29.03%*** - 
PM12 - -16.48%*** -25.40%*** - 
PM6 - -12.76%*** -18.08%*** - 
PM3 - -8.31%*** -11.54%*** ? 
Value vs. Growth Variables   
SG4 + -15.63% -14.91% - 
SG2 + -13.45% -13.25% - 
MB + -14.76%*** -20.23%*** - 
PE + -7.45%*** -10.08%*** ? 
Size + 4.46%*** -5.87%*** ? 
(The distinction of recessions and expansions is based on the NBER statistics.) 
In contrast to that, we document a discrepancy between what sign of correlation 
(positive/negative) was expected and what was actually found to exist in the following cases: 
Companies whose revenues face rather strong growth rates and whose stocks account for 
relatively high market-to-book and price-earnings ratios are considered as growth stocks 
(Fama and French (1998)). Empirical analyses have uncovered a negative relation of these 
aspects with future returns which should translate into a positive relationship with the 
magnitude of recommendations (i.e., higher rating scores). However, our results reveal a 
negative correlation for four quarters sales growth of -15.63 % and -14.91% respectively in 
expansion and recession which signifies that more positive recommendations (with smaller 
absolute values) are issued for firms which grow at relatively high levels. 
The same discrepancy is found for the market-to-book and price-earnings ratios. However, the 
correlation found under the latter metric is of a small magnitude (only -7.45%) and needs to 
be interpreted with some caution. The same applies for the size metric. In general, all 
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correlation coefficients are found to be significantly different at the 1% level during 
expansions and recessions except the sales growth metrics. According to Jegadeesh et al. 
(2004) analysts prefer firms high in operating performance. High market-to-book firms are 
generally higher in RoE and expected to grow at faster rates in the future. One could infer that 
analysts recognize and actively consider investment signals (which appears just logical in 
light of today’s extensive quantitative components of stock research) and in doubt weigh 
operating performance higher if the respective indicator is in a normative vs. actual conflict 
(Jegadeesh et al. (2004)). Generally speaking, analysts' preferences are not fully in line with 
empirical indications. Thus, their contribution to investors might be questioned. However, 
analysts' preference structure varies systematically across the business cycle. 
3.4 Robustness Checks 
3.4.1 Regulation FD, Median Returns, and CFNAI Business Cycle Classification 
Regulation Fair Disclosure (Reg FD) became effective on October, 23rd, 2000. Its goal was to 
prevent selective disclosure of material nonpublic information to investors and financial 
intermediaries such as stock analysts. As stated by the U.S. Securities and Exchange 
Commission (2000) “the practice of selective disclosure leads to a loss of investor confidence 
in the integrity of our capital markets. Investors who see a security's price change 
dramatically and only later are given access to the information responsible for that move 
rightly question whether they are on a level playing field with market insiders.” Recent 
findings indicate that Reg FD was successful in generating a more equal information 
environment for security analysts. For example, Cohen, Frazzini, and Malloy (2010) find that 
analysts generate more profitable stocks recommendations when they have an educational link 
to the company. However, the higher profitability almost diminished after Reg FD. 
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Table 3.6: Event Study: Excess returns according to DGTW (1997) after Reg FD 
This table presents the results of the event-study for the period 11/2000-12/2010 after Regulation Fair Disclose 
(Reg FD). The event-returns are shown for expansions and recessions according to the NBER classification. The 
excess returns are calculated according to DGTW (1997). The portfolio classifications follow Cohen, Frazzini, 
and Malloy (2010). The “Buy portfolio” consists of all upgraded stocks and stocks for which the analyst initiates, 
resumes or reiterates the coverage with a “Strong Buy or “Buy” recommendation. The “Sell portfolio” consists 
of all downgraded stocks and stocks for which the analyst initiates, resumes or reiterates the coverage with a 
“Hold”, “Sell” or “Strong Sell” recommendation. The upgraded and downgraded stocks are shown separately. 
The excess returns are shown for the announcement day (Day “0”), the first 3 trading days, 1 month, 3 months, 6 
months and 6 months excluding the announcement day. If recommendations are revised during the holding 
period, the stocks remain in the portfolio till the revision plus one trading day. A t-test is performed to evaluate 
whether the excess returns are significantly different from zero. *, ** and *** indicate significance at the 10, 5 
and 1%-level, respectively.  
Trading days 
 
Sample 
    
Recommendation Classification (Mean Returns) 
NBER         Buy-PF        Sell-PF       Upgrade     Downgrade 
0           
  Exp 1.54%*** -1.48%*** 2.55%*** -2.48%*** 
  Rec 1.83%*** -1.93%*** 3.11%*** -2.89%*** 
  Rec-Exp 0.29%*** -0.45%*** 0.56%*** -0.40%*** 
0 - 3           
  Exp 1.75%*** -2.09%*** 2.81%*** -3.34%*** 
  Rec 2.08%*** -3.03%*** 3.45%*** -4.42%*** 
  Rec-Exp 0.32%*** -0.94%*** 0.65%*** -1.08%*** 
1 month           
  Exp 1.81%*** -2.17%*** 3.23%*** -3.56%*** 
  Rec 1.59%*** -3.03%*** 3.38%*** -4.58%*** 
  Rec-Exp 0.32%** -1.27%*** 0.96%*** -1.41%*** 
3 months           
  Exp 1.83%*** -2.67%*** 3.22%*** -4.18%*** 
  Rec 1.48%*** -3.86%*** 3.48%*** -5.47%*** 
  Rec-Exp -0.49%** -1.34%*** -0.23% -1.52%*** 
6 months           
  Exp 1.76%*** -3.04%*** 3.20%*** -4.61%*** 
  Rec 0.20% -5.03%*** 2.02%*** -6.75%*** 
  Rec-Exp -1.47%*** -1.99%*** -1.11%*** -2.14%*** 
6 months (ex Day 0)           
Exp     0.19%* -1.28%*** 0.62%*** -1.71%*** 
Rec -1.60%*** -2.83%*** -1.00%** -3.38%*** 
  Rec-Exp 1.79%*** 1.55%*** 1.63%*** 1.67%*** 
(The distinction of recessions and expansions is based on the NBER statistics.) 
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Table 3.7: Event Study: Excess returns according to DGTW (1997) Medians 
This table presents the results of the event-study for the total sample period 01/1994-12/2010. The median event-
returns are shown for expansions and recessions according to the NBER classification. The median excess 
returns are calculated according to DGTW (1997). The portfolio classifications follow Cohen, Frazzini, and 
Malloy (2010). The “Buy portfolio” consists of all upgraded stocks and stocks for which the analyst initiates, 
resumes or reiterates the coverage with a “Strong Buy or “Buy” recommendation. The “Sell portfolio” consists 
of all downgraded stocks and stocks for which the analyst initiates, resumes or reiterates the coverage with a 
“Hold”, “Sell” or “Strong Sell” recommendation. The upgraded and downgraded stocks are shown separately. 
The excess returns are shown for the announcement day (Day “0”), the first 3 trading days, 1 month, 3 months, 6 
months and 6 months excluding the announcement day. If recommendations are revised during the holding 
period, the stocks remain in the portfolio till the revision plus one trading day.  
Trading days 
 
Sample 
    
Recommendation Classification (Median Returns) 
NBER      Buy-PF     Sell-PF     Upgrade     Downgrade 
0           
  Exp 0.53% -0.61% 0.99% -1.05% 
  Rec 0.88% -1.10% 1.70% -1.82% 
  Rec-Exp 0.35% -0.49% 0.71% -0.77% 
0 - 3   
  Exp 0.81% -1.11% 1.39% -1.73% 
  Rec 1.28% -1.97% 2.30% -2.92% 
  Rec-Exp 0.47% -0.86% 0.91% -1.19% 
1 month   
  Exp 0.79% -1.90% 1.54% -2.84% 
  Rec 0.79% -2.98% 1.85% -4.01% 
  Rec-Exp 0.00% -1.08% 0.31% -1.17% 
3 months   
  Exp 0.19% -2.95% 1.13% -3.97% 
  Rec -0.15% -4.66% 1.14% -5.76% 
  Rec-Exp -0.33% -1.71% 0.01% -1.79% 
6 months   
  Exp -0.54% -3.87% 0.60% -4.98% 
  Rec -1.48% -5.57% 0.12% -6.26% 
  Rec-Exp -0.94% -1.70% -0.48% -1.28% 
6 months (ex Day 0)   
Exp -1.07% -3.26% -0.39% -3.93% 
Rec -2.36% -4.47% -1.58% -4.44% 
   Rec-Exp -1.29% -1.21% -1.19% -0.51% 
(The distinction of recessions and expansions is based on the NBER statistics.) 
Since Reg FD had a significant impact on the information content of analysts’ stock 
recommendations we conduct a robustness check by using only recommendations issued from 
11/2000 to 12/2010. The results are shown in Table 3.6. Next, to check the robustness against 
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outliers we calculate median returns. The results are shown in Table 3.7. Table 3.7 shows the 
results when using median returns. For all portfolio classifications and holding periods the 
general direction is in line with the mean results. Using median returns does change the 
picture, i.e., our main results are not driven by outliers.  
Furthermore, we use the CFNAI business cycle definition instead of the NBER business cycle 
definition. According to the Federal Reserve of Chicago a value of the CFNAI moving 
average over 3 months below -0.7 indicates “an increasing likelihood that a recession has 
begun”. A value is above +0.2 indicates a “significant likelihood that a recession has 
ended”.16 Table 3.8 shows the results of the event-study when using the CFNAI business 
cycle classification. 
Table 3.8: Event Study: Excess returns according to DGTW (1997) (CFNAI) 
This table presents the results of the event-study for the total sample period 01/1994-12/2010. The event-returns 
are shown for expansions and recessions according to the CFNAI classification. The excess returns are 
calculated according to DGTW (1997). The portfolio classifications follow Cohen, Frazzini, and Malloy (2010). 
The “Buy portfolio” consists of all upgraded stocks and stocks for which the analyst initiates, resumes or 
reiterates the coverage with a “Strong Buy or “Buy” recommendation. The “Sell portfolio” consists of all 
downgraded stocks and stocks for which the analyst initiates, resumes or reiterates the coverage with a “Hold”, 
“Sell” or “Strong Sell” recommendation. The upgraded and downgraded stocks are shown separately. The excess 
returns are shown for the announcement day (Day “0”), the first 3 trading days, 1 month, 3 months, 6 months 
and 6 months excluding the announcement day. If recommendations are revised during the holding period, the 
stocks remain in the portfolio till the revision plus one trading day. A t-test is performed to evaluate whether the 
excess returns are significantly different from zero. *, ** and *** indicate significance at the 10, 5 and 1%-level, 
respectively.  
Trading days 
 
Sample 
    
Recommendation Classification (Mean Returns) 
CFNAI  Buy-PF  Sell-PF  Upgrade   Downgrade 
0           
  Exp 1.21%*** -1.49%*** 2.04%*** -2.26%*** 
  Rec 1.53%*** -1.72%*** 2.74%*** -2.69%*** 
  Rec-Exp 0.31%*** -0.22%*** 0.70%*** -0.43%*** 
0 - 3   
  Exp 1.39%*** -2.09%*** 2.28%*** -3.05%*** 
  Rec 1.74%*** -2.56%*** 3.10%*** -3.86%*** 
  Rec-Exp 0.35%*** -0.47%*** 0.81%*** -0.80%*** 
1 month   
  Exp 1.23%*** -2.47%*** 2.23%*** -3.71%*** 
                                                     
16 As a remainder, the recessions and expansions according to NBER and the CFNAI are shown in Figure 3.1.  
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  Rec 1.53%*** -2.47%*** 3.50%*** -3.92%*** 
  Rec-Exp 0.29%*** 0.00% 1.27%*** -0.21% 
3 months   
  Exp 1.54%*** -3.27%*** 2.61%*** -4.57%*** 
  Rec 1.49%*** -3.02%*** 3.53%*** -4.58%*** 
  Rec-Exp -0.05% 0.25%* 0.93%*** -0.01% 
6 months   
  Exp 1.71%*** -4.14%*** 2.89%*** -5.65%*** 
  Rec 0.84%*** -3.58%*** 2.93%*** -5.18%*** 
  Rec-Exp -0.88%*** 0.56%*** 0.04% 0.47%* 
6 months (ex Day 0)           
Exp 0.49%*** -2.40%*** 0.84%*** -3.03%*** 
Rec -0.67%*** -1.69%*** 0.26% -2.22%*** 
   Rec-Exp 1.16%*** -0.70%*** 0.58%** -0.82%** 
(The distinction of recessions and expansions is based on the CFNAI statistics.) 
Table 3.8 shows that the results are robust to the CFNAI business cycle definition.  
3.4.2 Herding Behavior17 
The arguably most prominent bias in analyst recommendations is herding. Observed herding 
behavior might be caused by independent similar information processing or mutual imitation. 
In so far that recessions are marked by a more volatile economic situation and thus more 
divergent information, it would be plausible that there is less herding due to the first 
explanation. With regard to the second case, the situation does not seem to be intuitively 
clear: As in general, analysts might either herd to be on the safe side or anti-herd to stand out 
from the crowd. A recession might only strengthen this pattern. In recessions and their more 
volatile market environment an analyst might have the desire not to be entirely wrong, or if 
so, at least not to be the only one. Thus, an analyst would herd more. On the other hand, it 
might be that under these circumstances the employer is more forgiving and she could 
therefore try a risky approach. Summarizing this reasoning, a different intensity of herding 
could be expected during recessions compared to expansions. 
                                                     
17 Departing from other analyses in this paper, we include observations starting from October 1993 until 
December 2010. 
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As a foundation for our herding study we use the Jegadeesh and Kim (2010) approach. Their 
model assumes that investors recognize herding and, ceteris paribus, react less to herders. 
They construct a model which controls for sensible other influences and assume that the 
remaining differences of event excess returns can at least partially be attributed to investors’ 
different behavior towards herders versus non-herders. Our approach employs the basic 
regression 
 
i
T-t T-t multi T-t single
T-t i,j,t i,t-1 i,j,t,T
ER (t,T)=a +b *I +c *I
+d *(New_rec -Con_rec )+ε  (3.8) 
Where 
Imulti = +1 if the revision increases the numerical I/B/E/S recommendation level18 (i.e., 
a downgrade) by  at least two labels 
 = -1 if the revision decreases the numerical I/B/E/S recommendation level (i.e., 
an upgrade) by at least two labels 
Isingle = +1 if the revision increases the numerical I/B/E/S recommendation level by 
exactly one label 
 = -1 if the revision decreases the numerical I/B/E/S recommendation level by 
exactly one label 
New_reci,j,t is the new recommendation level of analyst j for stock i on day t, after revision. 
Con_reci,t-1 is the consensus recommendation of all active recommendations (except of 
analyst j) about stock i one day before the revision. It is calculated as an arithmetic mean 
without weights using the I/B/E/S recommendation level codes. 
                                                     
18 Recommendation level codes are such, that the lower the better. We keep these values while Jegadeesh/Kim 
(2010) redefine the level codes and thus obtain opposing signs. 
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The excess returns are expected to be influenced by the recommendation revisions’ direction 
and intensity. If in addition there is a significant non-zero coefficient for the deviation from 
consensus (New_reci,j,t - Con_reci,j,t-1) then this means that the market participants assume one 
kind of herding behavior. The mere fact that one strays from the consensus would then lead to 
a more intense market reaction. Using the I/B/E/S recommendation codes a negative d stands 
for assumed regular herding behavior, while a positive d signifies an underlying anti-herding 
assumption. That would be the case when the market reaction rewards a move to consensus 
because supposedly the analysts’ information force him/her to do so, while his/her natural 
tendency would be rather to issue a divergent recommendation. 
The data is prepared according to Jegadeesh and Kim (2010). However, we employ linear 
regressions instead of Fama-MacBeth regressions.  
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Table 3.9: Herding: Expansions versus Recessions (NBER) 
This table presents the regression estimates for  
ܧܴ௜ሺݐ, ܶሻ ൌ ்ܽି௧ ൅ ்ܾି௧ כ ܫ௠௨௟௧௜ ൅ ்ܿି௧ כ ܫ௦௜௡௚௟௘ ൅ ்݀ି௧ כ ሺܰ݁ݓ_ݎ݁ܿ௜,௝,௧ െ ܥ݋݊_ݎ݁ܿ௜,௝,௧ିଵሻ ൅ ߝ௜,௝,௧,்  
where Imulti is 1 (-1) for a multi-step revision upwards (downwards) in I/B/E/S recommendations codes with 
lower values indicating better recommendations. Isingle is correspondingly defined for single-step revisions. 
New_reci,j,t - Con_reci,j,t-1 is the new revision’s deviation from the consensus level of active recommendations for 
the same company. Each T-t-period excess return is estimated for the complete sample and then individually for 
the sub-samples of expansive and recessive business cycle phases, as defined by NBER (Panel A) and CFNAI 
(Panel B, see next page). A Wald test is performed to compare the coefficients for deviation from consensus of 
expansions and recessions for equality, i.e., the null hypothesis is that the coefficients are the same. *, ** and 
*** indicate significance at the 10, 5 and 1%-level, respectively. Significance is only indicated for deviation 
from consensus for the sake of clarity. All other coefficients are significant at the 1%-level. The sample period is 
from October 1993 to December 2010. “t-stat” abbreviates t-statistic. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
N Coef. (%) t -stat Coef. (%) t -stat Coef. (%) t -stat
0 Complete 107,068 -2.26 -40.86 -2.27 -62.77 -0.64*** -19.85
Exp 92,160 -2.10 -35.80 -2.15 -56.73 -0.66*** -19.24
Rec 14,908 -3.15 -19.61 -3.07 -27.21 -0.54*** -5.74
Exp-Rec (P > χ²)
1 Complete 107,060 -2.63 -42.58 -2.59 -64.38 -0.71*** -19.83
Exp 92,154 -2.44 -37.43 -2.44 -57.97 -0.72*** -18.83
Rec 14,906 -3.64 -20.23 -3.60 -28.50 -0.68*** -6.50
Exp-Rec (P > χ²)
2 Complete 107,042 -2.76 -42.28 -2.69 -63.12 -0.72*** -18.87
Exp 92,141 -2.56 -37.27 -2.54 -57.23 -0.73*** -18.14
Rec 14,901 -3.88 -19.77 -3.73 -27.08 -0.67*** -5.83
Exp-Rec (P > χ²)
21 Complete 106,478 -3.09 -27.88 -3.22 -44.44 -0.80*** -12.40
Exp 91,624 -2.97 -25.70 -3.10 -41.52 -0.83*** -12.24
Rec 14,854 -3.73 -10.87 -3.96 -16.44 -0.68*** -3.42
Exp-Rec (P > χ²)
42 Complete 105,378 -3.21 -21.04 -3.45 -34.64 -0.91*** -10.15
Exp 90,618 -3.11 -19.53 -3.31 -32.29 -0.98*** -10.52
Rec 14,760 -3.78 -7.95 -4.29 -12.89 -0.54* -1.95
Exp-Rec (P > χ²)
126 Complete 101,003 -3.55 -13.21 -3.83 -21.91 -1.17*** -7.49
Exp 86,605 -3.41 -12.00 -3.60 -19.71 -1.39*** -8.40
Rec 14,398 -4.27 -5.47 -5.09 -9.32 -0.12 -0.26
Exp-Rec (P > χ²)
Panel A: NBER
(0.02)**
(0.25)
(0.77)
(0.63)
(0.51)
(0.14)
Days 
since 
revision
(Sub-)
Sample
I_single  (= 1 or -1, 
single level)
I_multi  (= 1 or -1, 
multi level)
Deviation from 
consensus
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Table 3.9: continued 
 
In order to test the impact of herding we analyze the coefficients for deviation from 
consensus. Within the NBER classification (Panel A), the difference between expansions and 
recessions is only significant for 126 trading days. The coefficient for recessions alone, 
however, is not significant anymore for that time period. This is most probably due to noise 
which is successively introduced in all coefficients in longer time periods and which should 
be even higher in volatile recessions. Moreover, as the shorter durations do not show any 
significant differences, this result for that duration can be considered meaningless. All other 
differences are insignificant at the 10%-level. 
The CFNAI classifications (Panel B of Table 3.9) show a surprisingly different picture. While 
the difference is insignificant, the NBER differentiation still indicates that the magnitude of 
N Coef. (%) t -stat Coef. (%) t -stat Coef. (%) t -stat 
0 Complete 107,068 -2.26 -40.86 -2.27 -62.77 -0.64*** -19.85 
Exp 71,169 -1.88 -30.10 -2.06 -50.79 -0.59*** -16.20 
Rec 35,899 -3.02 -27.74 -2.70 -37.55 -0.74*** -11.67 
Exp-Rec (P > ?²)
1 Complete 107,060 -2.63 -42.58 -2.59 -64.38 -0.71*** -19.83 
Exp 71,164 -2.20 -31.62 -2.32 -51.46 -0.65*** -15.96 
Rec 35,896 -3.47 -28.65 -3.14 -39.27 -0.84*** -11.89 
Exp-Rec (P > ?²)
2 Complete 107,042 -2.76 -42.28 -2.69 -63.12 -0.72*** -18.87 
Exp 71,151 -2.30 -31.40 -2.40 -50.38 -0.66*** -15.43 
Rec 35,891 -3.67 -28.43 -3.29 -38.63 -0.83*** -11.06 
Exp-Rec (P > ?²)
21 Complete 106,478 -3.09 -27.88 -3.22 -44.44 -0.80*** -12.40 
Exp 70,656 -2.68 -21.08 -2.96 -35.88 -0.78*** -10.57 
Rec 35,822 -3.92 -18.36 -3.78 -26.79 -0.84*** -6.74 
Exp-Rec (P > ?²)
42 Complete 105,378 -3.21 -21.04 -3.45 -34.64 -0.91*** -10.15 
Exp 69,725 -2.82 -15.97 -3.22 -28.04 -0.94*** -9.07 
Rec 35,653 -4.01 -13.89 -4.01 -21.05 -0.84*** -5.01 
Exp-Rec (P > ?²)
126 Complete 101,003 -3.55 -13.21 -3.83 -21.91 -1.17*** -7.49 
Exp 66,093 -3.07 -9.45 -3.59 -17.12 -1.49*** -7.85 
Rec 34,910 -4.62 -9.78 -4.58 -14.70 -0.59** -2.15 
Exp-Rec (P > ?²)
(0.70)
(0.64)
(0.01)** 
Days 
since 
revision 
I_multi (= 1 or -1, 
multi level)
I_single  (= 1 or -1, 
single level)
Deviation from 
consensus 
Panel B: CFNAI
(Sub-) 
Sample
(0.06)* 
(0.03)** 
(0.06)* 
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herding might be less in recessions. In the CFNAI results the coefficient is just the opposite: 
bigger for recessions, not smaller. This difference is even significant in the short and long run 
(albeit not in the medium term). The CFNAI is released monthly and therefore corresponds 
better to what analysts and other market participants actually know at the time of their 
decision making. Therefore, there might be some kind of herding effect, after all. CFNAI 
more easily proclaims a recession than NBER. Essentially the CFNAI recessions consist of 
the NBER recessions plus some fringe months at the beginning and end of NBER-recessions. 
It might be that market participants subdivide the business cycle into at least four stages 
instead of two. And just during the transition phases form expansion to recession and from 
recession to expansion (covered by CFNAI), there might be more herding taking place. But 
there might also be a problem of the model. Maybe the consensus recommendation is just too 
old and as the market is volatile describes a situation which is not valid anymore, so that a 
new recommendation which takes into account the current situation can easily beat the odds.  
Summarizing, there is no difference in herding behavior between recessions and expansions. 
This finding is in line with Lin, Chen, and Chen (2011) but contrary to Welch (2000).  
3.5 Conclusion 
We show that it is crucial to control for the effects of macroeconomic fluctuations when 
assessing analysts’ stock recommendations. Dependent on the business cycle we find 
significantly different price formation patterns after recommendations have been issued. In 
addition to analyst characteristics (e.g., Hess, Kreutzmann, and Pucker (2012)), economic 
activity is an important determinant of the profitability of stock recommendations.  
Our study shows that in recessions analysts are too optimistic with regard to the stocks they 
suggest as a “Buy”. Such recommendations do not have long-term investment value. 
Interestingly, our results indicate that investors are not aware of this severe bias. In recessions, 
the initial market reaction to “Buy” recommendations is even stronger than in expansions. 
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This finding points out that the information content and the information processing of stock 
recommendations differ dependent on the business cycle. The unique information set of 
analysts (Grossman and Stiglitz (1980)) is assumed to be more valuable in recessions by 
market participants. However, analysts only issue profitable “Sell” recommendations in 
recessions, while “Buy” recommendations do not generate excess returns.  
A plausible explanation for the difference in profitability is attributable to the nature of the 
stocks that are recommended: We show that analysts favor “glamour” over “value” stocks in 
recessions and expansions. However, the bias for glamour stocks does not pay off in terms of 
long-term investment value: The glamour stocks that are recommended to buy only generate 
excess returns in expansions. In recessions, analysts overestimate their investment value.  
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Chapter 4 – Do Aggregate Company Outlooks have Macroeconomic 
Content? 
4.1 Introduction 
The state determination of the economy and the prediction of future macroeconomic 
developments are essential for many purposes, e.g., to guide monetary policy decisions or 
decisions about federal tax cuts to stimulate economic growth. In this context coincident and 
leading macroeconomic indicators play an important role. Economic agents rely on them to 
gauge how the economy is doing and how it will likely do in the future. To measure economic 
activity these indicators incorporate a wide information set of macroeconomic variables, such 
as industrial production and capital market related measures, such as interest rate spreads and 
stock returns. Company expectations as a valuable source of information to forecast overall 
economic activity, however, are not directly included. To a substantial extent the economy 
consists of firms listed on the stock market. About one-third of all employees in the U.S. 
private business sector work at publicly traded companies (Davis (2006)). Therefore, the 
development of the overall economy is significantly related to the development of these firms 
as a whole. In this paper we show that aggregated company outlooks predict overall economic 
activity, i.e., combined forecasts of individual parts of the economy predict the entire 
economy. As a proxy for individual company level outlooks we use analysts’ stock 
recommendations, since analysts have direct access to company specific information and 
therefore their information set is arguably the best available proxy for company specific 
forecasts.  
At the firm level, company managers must make various decisions that are of great 
importance for the company such as investment decisions, financing decisions, employment 
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decisions etc. Moreover, managers plan their actions ahead by setting specific goals. For 
example, the decision of managers to lay off a significant amount of the company’s workforce 
in the next couple of months to cut expenses is a crucial decision for the future development 
of the company. Nevertheless, decisions at the firm-level are ceteris paribus not important for 
the overall economy. However, aggregated projected layoffs over all companies, which in 
sum constitute a significant amount of the entire economy, are basically a crucial input to 
forecast future employment figures. The same argumentation holds for other company 
specific information such as orders, production, and capacity utilization. Every company 
outlook includes growth perspectives and therefore information whether the management 
assumes a more optimistic or pessimistic development of the company over the next months 
and years. Consequently, aggregated expectations over all companies contain predictive 
power for future macroeconomic developments. 
Observing and predicting the entire economy is similar to observing all companies in the 
economy simultaneously and aggregating these observations. Unfortunately, we cannot 
observe managers’ expectations directly and a survey of all companies is unfeasible for 
several reasons (e.g., cost, timing etc.). However, stock analysts collect and process all kinds 
of information at the firm level for publicly traded companies. Besides public 
macroeconomic-, industry- and company-specific content their information sets should also 
comprise non-public company-specific information (Grossman and Stiglitz (1980)). By 
attending analysts’ conferences, management meetings, and telephone conferences, stock 
analysts develop a sound understanding of the company’s business and its future 
performance. Due to their extensive company knowledge their information set is arguably the 
best available proxy measure for company specific outlooks. In addition to public company 
information it presumably contains company-specific information that is not public 
knowledge. Analysts issue stock recommendations that indicate a general direction of the 
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development of the underlying company: A positive recommendation suggests in general a 
relatively positive development, while a negative recommendation suggests in general a 
relatively negative development. We show that aggregating these signals over all companies 
listed on the stock market allows conclusions about the overall economy. 
The existing literature provides support for our new approach to combine macroeconomic 
developments with stock analysts’ outputs. Previous literature indicates that analyst 
recommendations have predictive power for stock returns on a firm-level, i.e., analysts 
possess a unique company specific information set. Womack (1996) shows that 
recommendations lead to a significant post-announcement drift up to 6 months. Barber et al. 
(2001) demonstrate that a trading strategy based on recommendations yields significant 
excess returns before transaction costs. Howe et al. (2009) find that aggregated 
recommendations predict future excess returns on a market level. Stock returns in turn have 
predictive power for macroeconomic activity. Stock and Watson (1998) provide evidence that 
the stock market leads the real economy. Consequently, it is reasonable to analyze the 
predictive power of analysts’ recommendations for macroeconomic developments. If 
analysts’ outputs can forecast stock market developments and the stock market anticipates 
macroeconomic developments, then analysts’ recommendations should also contain predictive 
power for the real economy. 
To the best of our knowledge, we provide the first study to show this link. To do so we use 
monthly changes in aggregated analysts’ recommendations as a proxy for changes in 
aggregated company outlooks. We evaluate the predictive power of company outlook changes 
for future macroeconomic developments by using a regression framework in which we 
analyze the relation of recommendation changes to changes in a broad measure of economic 
activity. Our results provide evidence that aggregated company outlooks have predictive 
power for future macroeconomic developments of about one year. Our results remain valid 
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when we control for other well-known macroeconomic predictors, such as the term-spread 
and the dividend yield. We find that the predictive power of aggregated company outlooks is 
not included in the Leading Economic Indicator (LEI) – which specifically has been 
developed to forecast economic activity – and other well-known macroeconomic predictors.  
Overall, we show that aggregated company outlooks are an important macroeconomic 
variable that has been overlooked so far when forecasting economic developments. This result 
might be especially of interest to agencies which release economic indicators as well as to 
investors who might incorporate this information to form better expectations of upcoming 
overall economic activity. Our results also suggest that analysts implicitly or explicitly 
anticipate macroeconomic developments when processing information in their stock 
recommendations. The change in the aggregated monthly consensus has predictive power for 
the upcoming economic development up to about one year. Indicating that analysts have first-
hand information about the individual firms they cover, our findings therefore also support the 
theoretical notion that analysts play an important role as financial intermediaries (Grossman 
and Stiglitz (1980)). Moreover, our results indicate a link between previous studies: Stock and 
Watson (1998) show that the stock market leads the real economy, while Howe et al. (2009) 
provide evidence that aggregated analysts’ recommendations predict the overall stock market. 
Our results fill the missing link between both studies, since we find that aggregated analysts’ 
recommendations also predict the real economy. We provide evidence that changes in 
expectations about future firm performance rationally (i.e., correct on average) determine 
asset values before overall economic activity changes. Therefore, our results provide a 
potential explanation, why the stock market leads the real economy. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 4.2, we introduce the research 
design. Section 4.3 describes the data. Section 4.4 discusses the empirical results. Finally, 
section 4.5 concludes. 
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4.2 Research Design 
We consider the following general model to forecast overall macroeconomic activity: 
 t,t+τ t tEconomic Activity =α+β Aggregated CompanyOutlooks +ε .⋅  (4.1) 
Unfortunately, company outlooks cannot be observed directly. We argue that assessments of 
analysts who cover the companies and therefore process company expectations are a good 
proxy for company outlooks. Sell side analysts aggregate a vast amount of information on the 
company level in their role as information intermediaries on financial markets. Since analysts 
possess a first-hand information set about the covered companies, it is straightforward to 
approximate companies’ expectations with analysts’ outputs. Our approach is supported by 
the theoretical notion that analysts’ outputs should contain more than just public knowledge 
(Grossmann and Stiglitz (1980)). 
However, since analysts issue two key outputs, namely earnings per share (EPS) forecasts and 
stock recommendations, the proxy measure’s choice should be carefully considered. We 
decide to focus on stock recommendations19 for the following reasons. First, revisions of 
earnings forecasts might be based on stale information, while revisions of stock 
recommendations are not (Jegadeesh and Kim (2010)). Second, recommendations contain 
more information than earnings forecasts. A recommendation reflects the upcoming yearly 
earnings, as well as all future earnings, the payout ratios and discount rates. Therefore, to 
determine the value of a company the analyst needs interest rates, risk premiums and growth 
expectations as inputs in addition to EPS forecasts. These are basically the same information 
the company manager has to consider when making investment decisions for the firm. 
Consequently, solely using EPS forecasts is not sufficient because a substantial proportion of 
                                                     
19 As an alternative measure, we analyze the predictive content of changes in aggregate earnings forecasts. The 
results are discussed in section 4.4. 
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the information would be neglected. Third, a measure with “natural” boundaries is preferred 
to identify significant expectation changes.20 While small changes of EPS forecasts might be 
due to minor changes in expectations, a recommendation revision is the result of major 
changes and therefore it is a clear interpretable signal that the companies’ prospects changed 
significantly. Fourth, it is desirable to have a proxy measure undistorted by the impact of 
accounting policies and accounting standard changes. A company is easily able to influence, 
to a certain degree, their earnings per share by applying the accounting standards in different 
ways (“earnings management”). Therefore, analysts have to adjust their earnings forecasts 
even without a change in the underlying fundamentals. Moreover, our model would receive an 
incorrect signal if accounting standards are changed and as a consequence thereof all EPS 
forecasts change without fundamental reason, e.g., when stock option compensation is treated 
differently from an accounting perspective. Fifth, we avoid a “forecast horizon problem”, 
since recommendations are always valid for a certain future time period (usually up to one 
year if not revised) independent of the point in time of the fiscal year they are issued. In 
contrast, the forecast horizon of EPS forecasts is determined by the end of a firm’s fiscal year. 
For example, an earnings forecast issued on October 1st, for a firm with a fiscal year end at 
December 31st, has a forecast horizon of three months. An earnings forecast for the same firm 
issued one month later would have a forecast horizon of two months. Recommendations are 
easier to compare and to aggregate, since they are based on expectations for stable forecast 
periods. Following these considerations our main proxy measure for company outlooks are 
analysts’ recommendations. 
We are aware of the fact that analysts’ recommendations might be biased, for instance that 
they are overoptimistic.21 However, assuming that their incentive-driven overoptimism is 
                                                     
20 In I/B/E/S all recommendations are coded as integers between 1 (“Strong Buy”) to 5 (“Strong Sell”).  
21 See for instance Jegadeesh et al. (2004). 
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constant over time this does not constitute a problem. Since we use recommendation changes, 
the positive bias cancels out.  
Our dependent variable in Equation 4.1, the measure for economic activity, is the 3-month 
moving average of the Chicago Fed National Activity Index (CFNAI) and the 3-month 
average of its four components.22 Based on the methodology of Stock and Watson (1999b) the 
index is a weighted average of 85 macroeconomic series from four categories: 23 series from 
production and income, 24 series from employment, unemployment, and hours, 15 series 
from personal consumption and housing, and 23 series from sales, orders, and inventories. 
The four categories’ contributions are for (1) Production and Income (PI) about 33%, (2) 
Employment, Unemployment, and Hours (EUH) 32%, (3) Personal Consumption and 
Housing (CH) 14% and (4) Sales, Orders and Inventories (SOI) 21%. The CFNAI is a “single 
summary measure of a common factor” (Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago (2012)) in these 
series which is released monthly. It is constructed to have an average value of zero and a 
standard deviation of one. A positive value of the CFNAI implies economic growth above the 
historical trend, while a negative value corresponds to growth below the trend. The three- 
month-moving-average of the CFNAI has desirable properties concerning the state 
determination of the economy. Compared to other measures, such as the GDP, the timely 
availability of the CFNAI provides valuable information about the state of the economy 
almost in real time on a monthly basis.23 
Our analysis proceeds in 4 steps. First, for each month we calculate the consensus of stock 
recommendations issued in the respective month. In contrast to Howe et al. (2009), we solely 
use recommendations issued in the respective month and not all recommendations 
outstanding in the respective month to remove stale recommendations and to focus solely on 
the most recent information. In a second step, to measure the changes of managers’ 
                                                     
22 For information on the CFNAI see www.chicagofed.org/webpages/research/data/cfnai/current_data.cfm. 
23 For a quality evaluation of the CFNAI see for instance Evans et al. (2002). 
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expectations we calculate the monthly change of the consensus ( trec_consensus ) in month t 
D trec . We define the monthly consensus change in month t as: 
 t t-1t
t-1
rec_consensus -rec_consensus
rec =
rec_consensus
D  (4.2) 
The monthly consensus change in t is the percentage change in the consensus of all stock 
recommendations issued in month t compared to month t-1. In the third step we quantify the 
in month t unknown upcoming change of the economic indicator ( CFNAID ) between t and 
( )1,...,t Tt t+ = for different future time periods. Finally, in the fourth step, we perform a 
regression of the change of the economic indicator on the recommendation change, several 
lags of the dependent variable and various controls as specified in Equation 4.3: 
 , 1
2
, 1,...,
N
n
t t t n t t
n
CFNAI rec control variable Tt a b b e t+
=
D = + ⋅ D + ⋅ + " =å  (4.3) 
where all variables are specified as previously described and te denotes the error term.  
We estimate the model in different settings. First, we estimate the predictive power of a 
recommendation change for the future CFNAI development alone. In a second setting, to 
control for other common variables which possess macroeconomic prediction power, we 
specifically control for changes in the Leading Economic Indicator ( leiD ), market excess 
returns (mex), dividend yield (divy), default spread (defs), term spread (tes), 3-month T-Bill 
rate (3mtb), and three lags of the dependent variable. Third, we analyze the predictive power 
of the recommendation change for the four CFNAI components (IP, EUH, CH, and SOI) 
separately. Fourth, we only use stock recommendations issued for S&P 500 firms. Fifth, as an 
alternative measure for company outlooks, we evaluate the predictive power of changes in 
aggregate earnings forecasts. 
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4.3 Data 
Table 4.1: Summary Statistics 
This table reports the abbreviations, units as well as summary statistics, i.e., the mean (m ), standard deviation 
(s ), as well as minimum and maximum values of our set of variables. These include the Chicago Fed National 
Activity Index (CFNAI) and the changes of the respective CFNAI components Production and Income (PI), 
Employment, Unemployment and Hours (EUH), Personal Consumption and Housing (CH), and Sales, Orders, 
and Inventories (SOI), the Recommendation Change, the recommendation change if only companies in the S&P 
500 are considered (Reco. Change (S&P 500)), the Leading Economic Indicator (LEI), monthly market excess 
returns calculated as the difference of the monthly market index return and the monthly risk-free rate including 
all NYSE, AMEX and NASDAQ firms (Market Excess Return), the Dividend Yield, the Default Spread 
(calculated as the difference between Moody’s Baa corporate bond yield and the 10-year Treasury constant 
maturity rate), the 3-months T-Bill rate, the Term Spread (calculated as the difference between the 10-year 
Treasury constant maturity rate and the 3-month T-Bill rate), as well as the number of submitted 
recommendations (monthly Recommendations). 
Variable Abbr. Unit μ s  Min Max 
CFNAI     Change -0.0023 0.2293 -1.0074 0.6226 
CFNAI IP     Change 0.0003 0.1245 -0.5467 0.3333 
CFNAI EUH     Change -0.0008 0.0775 -0.2934 0.2576 
CFNAI CH     Change -0.0020 0.0211 -0.1058 0.0845 
CFNAI SOI     Change 0.0003 0.0323 -0.1046 0.1433 
Recommendation Change Δrec % Change 0.0002 0.0241 -0.0733 0.0629 
Reco. Change (S&P 500) ΔrecS&P500 % Change 0.0000 0.1109 -0.3456 0.4194 
Leading Economic Indicator LEI % Change 0.0022 0.0053 -0.0147 0.0154 
Market Excess Return mex % Change 0.41 4.67 -18.54     11.04 
Dividend Yield divy % 1.87 0.53 1.11 3.60 
Default Spread defs % 2.31 0.89 1.29 6.01 
3-months T-Bill rate 3mtb % 3.46 1.87 0.03 6.17 
Term Spread tes % 1.64 1.18 -0.53 3.70 
Monthly Recommendations  #      2572      644     1812     7709 
Our sample ranges from January 1994 to March 2010. Table 4.1 shows means ( )m , standard 
deviations ( )s  as well as minimal and maximal values of the variables used in the analysis. 
We apply the Phillips–Perron test to verify that the time series data do not contain a unit-root 
and we do not find evidence for non-stationarity.24 
We obtain vintage data (whenever available) for the CFNAI and its four components25 from 
the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago to adequately describe the available information about 
                                                     
24 Results are reported in Appendix 4 A. 
25 We use the 3-month moving average of the CFNAI and its components. 
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the state of the economy at every single point of time.26 Figure 4.1 shows the CFNAI 
development from January 1994 to March 2010. 
Figure 4.1: CFNAI Development 
 
Analyst recommendations are obtained from the Institutional Brokers’ Estimate System 
(I/B/E/S). We use the following filters for the recommendations: (1) we only keep 
recommendations for US-American firms to be consistent with the CFNAI measure, and (2) 
we drop 696 recommendations from our sample in order to control for obvious data base 
errors.27 Our final sample consists of 499,571 stock recommendations.  
We calculate the monthly aggregated mean analyst recommendation with the 
recommendations issued in the respective month. On average we consider 2,575 
recommendations issued per month. Figure 4.2 visualizes the aggregated analyst 
recommendations from January 1994 to March 2010. 
                                                     
26 Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago (2012). 
27 Specifically, we drop recommendations that have been issued by the same analyst from the same broker on the 
same day for the same firm with the same rating. 
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Figure 4.2: Average Consensus Recommendation  
 
In the I/B/E/S database the recommendations are coded as follows: 1= “Strong Buy”, 2 = 
“Buy”, 3 = “Hold”, 4 = “Sell”, and 5 = “Strong Sell”. In line with previous literature (e.g., 
Jegadeesh and Kim (2010)) we reverse the ratings to facilitate a more intuitive interpretation. 
A “Strong Buy” receives the values of 5, a “Buy” a value of 4, a “Hold” a value of 3, a “Sel”l 
a value of 2, and a “Strong Sell” a value of 1. Therefore, a higher consensus recommendation 
implies a more optimistic analyst outlook. Figure 4.2 illustrates that the overall 
recommendation level varies significantly in the analyzed 1994 to 2010 time period. 
Jagadeesh and Kim (2010) point out that the mean recommendation level dropped 
significantly in 2002 when analysts were alleged of being overly optimistic by the New York 
State Attorney General’s office. 
Data about the Leading Economic Index are obtained from Reuters. Monthly market excess 
returns are calculated by using the difference of the monthly market index return and the 
monthly risk-free rate including all NYSE, AMEX and NASDAQ firms. We obtain the data 
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for monthly market excess returns from the website of Kenneth French.28 We retrieve the 
monthly dividend yield from the homepage of Robert Shiller.29 The 3-month T-Bill rate, the 
default spread (calculated as the difference between Moody’s Baa corporate bond yield and 
the 10-year Treasury constant maturity rate), and the term spread (calculated as the difference 
between the 10-year Treasury constant maturity rate and the 3-month T-Bill rate) are obtained 
from the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis (2011). 
4.4 Results 
Table 4.2 shows the results of the univariate regression of the recommendation change on the 
upcoming CFNAI development. The column “Base Model” shows coefficient estimates of the 
model without any control variables. The results provide strong evidence that aggregate 
company level information has economic content. The aggregated stock recommendations 
have predictive power for the upcoming economic activity up to 7 months. Improving 
company outlooks, i.e., better recommendations ( 0D >rec ) imply positive changes of 
overall economic activity as measured by CFNAI changes. 
  
                                                     
28 French (2011). 
29 Shiller (2011). 
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Table 4.2: CFNAI Developments and Changing Company Outlooks 
This table reports results from the following model: 
, 1
2
, 1,...,
N
n
t t t n t t
n
CFNAI rec control variable Tt a b b e t+
=
D = + ⋅ D + ⋅ + " =å , 
where the “Base Model” β is estimated without control variables and the “Control Model” β is estimated with 
control for changes in the Leading Economic Indicator ( leiD ), market excess returns (mex), dividend yield 
(divy), default spread (defs), term spread (tes), 3-month T-Bill rate (3mtb), and three lags of the dependent 
variable. Inference is based on Newey-West Standard Errors. *, **, *** indicates significance at the 10%, 5% and 
1% level, respectively. 
Base Model Control Model 
Horizon 
 1
b  1b  
1 2.250*** 2.042** 
2 2.879*** 2.635** 
3 2.981** 3.294*** 
4 2.207* 2.557** 
5 2.233* 2.651* 
6 2.564* 2.720* 
7 3.102** 3.539** 
8 2.005 2.610 
9 2.516 2.848* 
10 1.934 2.469 
11 1.276 2.953* 
12   1.192  2.066 
In a second setting (“Control Model”), we control for well-established macroeconomic 
variables as discussed in Section 4.2 to ensure that our measure is not just a summary measure 
of well-known variables which possess macroeconomic prediction power. We use changes in 
the Leading Economic Indicator ( leiD ),30 market excess returns (mex), dividend yield (divy), 
default spread (defs), term spread (tes), 3-month T-Bill rate (3mtb), and three lags of the 
dependent variable as control variables. The correlation matrix between the CFNAI changes 
and the control variables can be found in Appendix 4 B. 
When controlling for macroeconomic variables that are well-known predictors of economic 
activity the aggregated recommendation change is still significant. Except for the 1- and 2- 
                                                     
30 The LEI combines 10 single series with predictive power.  
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months horizons the coefficients are even larger. The coefficients of the aggregated 
recommendation change predict the upcoming 1-month to 11-months changes of economic 
activity. The results show that our measure contains unique information not captured in the 4 
macroeconomic control variables as well as in the LEI, which was specifically designed to 
predict economic activity. While the control variables contain information about growth (LEI 
and dividend yield), risk premiums (market excess returns and default spreads) as well as 
interest rates (3-months T-Bill rate and term spread) our results suggest that aggregate 
company outlooks contain even more information about the development of the economy.  
The results are economically significant. For example, the coefficient for the 1-month forward 
CFNAI change is 2.042, while the standard deviation of the recommendation change is 
0.0241. Therefore, a one standard deviation increase in the recommendation change suggests 
a change in the CFNAI for the upcoming month of 0.05. This is relatively high since the 
CFNAI has by construction a mean of zero and a standard deviation of one.  
Next, we analyze the predictive power of the recommendation change for the four individual 
CFNAI components. (1) Production and Income (PI) contributes about 33%, (2) Employment, 
Unemployment, and Hours (EUH) 32%, (3) Personal Consumption and Housing (CH) 14%, 
and (4) Sales, Orders and Inventories (SOI) 21% to the CFNAI.31 We use the same control 
variables as for the analysis of the whole CFNAI. The results are reported in Table 4.3. 
                                                     
31 The weights are readjusted monthly. The shifts in weights are rather small, see Federal Reserve Bank of 
Chicago (2012b). 
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Table 4.3: CFNAI Components Development and Changing Company Outlooks 
This table reports results from the following model: 
, 1
2
_ , 1,..., ,+
=
D = + ⋅D + ⋅ + " =åN nt t t n t t
n
CFNAI COMPONENT rec control variable Tt a b b e t
where the “Control Model” β for the respective CFNAI Components Production and Income (PI), Employment, 
Unemployment and Hours (EUH), Personal Consumption and Housing (CH), and Sales, Orders, and Inventories 
(SOI) is estimated with control for changes in the Leading Economic Indicator ( leiD ), market excess returns 
(mex), dividend yield (divy), default spread (defs), term spread (tes), 3-month T-Bill rate (3mtb), and three lags 
of the dependent variable. Inference is based on Newey-West Standard Errors. *, **, *** indicates significance at 
the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. 
Control Model Control Model Control Model Control Model 
 
PI EUH CH  SOI 
Horizon 1b  1b  1b  1b  
1 1.084** 0.121 0.118* -0.0118 
2 1.814*** 0.341 0.121 0.0841 
3 2.063*** 0.967** 0.179 0.1255 
4 1.112* 0.911** 0.102 0.228** 
5 1.034 1.197** 0.222 0.1541 
6 1.533** 1.051** 0.202 0.237** 
7 2.142*** 1.099*** 0.239 0.202* 
8 1.349** 1.055* 0.153 0.218* 
9 1.083 0.950* 0.201 0.261** 
10 0.864 1.209** 0.215 0.248** 
11 1.499** 1.220** 0.177 0.260** 
12 0.918 1.280** 0.114 0.157 
The results show that the predictive power of the recommendation change varies drastically 
for the four CFNAI components. The size of the coefficients is directly comparable. We find 
moderate predictive power for PI and EUH, relatively low predictive power for the SOI 
component, and no predictive power for CH. These results correspond to the weights of the 
individual series in the CFNAI and therefore to the relative importance for economic activity. 
Changes in company outlooks have less predictive power for individual measures of 
economic activity than for the CFNAI as an aggregate measure of economic activity. 
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To further evaluate the properties of aggregated company outlooks we restrict the sample to 
firms listed on the S&P 500. We again perform the previous analysis, however, the 
aggregated recommendation change is calculated only for S&P 500 firms. Using only 
outlooks of a part of the entire economy the number of observed companies decreases and 
consequently the number of issued stock recommendations also declines to an average of 552 
recommendations per months compared to 2,575 recommendations in the base case where the 
entire economy is considered. The results are shown in Table 4.4. 
Table 4.4: CFNAI Development and Changing Company Outlooks S&P 500 only 
This table reports results from the following model: 
 
N
S P n
t t t n t t
n
CFNAI rec control variable T& 500, 1
2
, 1,..., ,t a b b e t+
=
D = + ⋅ D + ⋅ + " =å  
where the “Base Model” β is estimated without control variables and the “Control Model” β is estimated with 
control for changes in the Leading Economic Indicator ( leiD ), market excess returns (mex), dividend yield 
(divy), default spread (defs), term spread (tes), 3-month T-Bill rate (3mtb), and three lags of the dependent 
variable. Only S&P 500 firms are considered in the consensus recommendation calculation. Inference is based 
on Newey-West Standard Errors. *, **, *** indicates significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. 
Base Model Control Model 
Horizon  
1b   1b  
1 1.655** 1.755** 
2 1.709** 2.177** 
3 1.454 2.430** 
4 1.202 2.313** 
5 1.695* 2.774** 
6 1.914* 2.963** 
7 1.916 3.151** 
8 0.896 2.342* 
9 0.651 1.942 
10 1.411 2.713** 
11 0.467 2.764** 
12   0.907  2.727** 
The results point out that our general results are somewhat weaker when using only the firms 
listed on the S&P 500. The aggregated recommendation change predicts economic activity up 
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to 11 months (“Control Model”).32 The coefficient is smaller for 8 out of 12 months. The 
results indicate that using outputs from a larger sample leads to more predictive power than 
using only outlooks of companies listed in the S&P 500. However, since the largest publicly 
traded companies are included in the S&P 500 the economic difference is rather small.  
Overall, our results show that aggregated company outlooks proxied by aggregated stock 
recommendations are an important macroeconomic predictor. The information set included in 
the aggregated company outlooks is not reflected in other established macroeconomic 
variables making it a valuable predictor for macroeconomic developments. 
Next, we analyze aggregated company outlooks proxied by aggregated earnings forecasts as 
an alternative measure for company outlooks. Each month we calculate the median earnings 
per share forecast based on earnings forecasts issued in the respective month. In order to 
control for different forecast horizons we calculate the median earnings per share forecast 
separately for forecasts with a forecast horizon of less or equal to 3 months, less or equal to 6 
months, less or equal to 12 months and greater than 12 months. Since earnings per share 
forecasts show seasonal patterns we calculate the monthly change in the earnings forecasts 
relatively to the aggregate median earnings forecast twelve months ago. Finally, we apply the 
Baxter-King filter33 with a minimum period of oscillation of 18 and a maximum oscillation 
period of 96 corresponding to monthly date. The calculation of the monthly change in 
aggregated earnings per share forecasts is shown below: 
 , 12,
12,
_ _
_
t Horizon t Horizon
t
t Horizon
Median EPS Median EPS
EPS
Median EPS
-
-
-D =  (4.4) 
Estimation results are shown in Table 4.5: 
                                                     
32 Results for the 12-month horizon should be handled with care due to non-stationarity issues according to the 
Phillips–Perron test. 
33 Baxter and King (1999). 
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Table 4.5: CFNAI Developments and Changing Median Earnings Forecasts 
This table reports results from the following model: 
, 1
2
, 1,..., ,+
=
D = + ⋅D + ⋅ + " =åN nt t t n t t
n
CFNAI EPS control variable Tt a b b e t  
where the “Control Model” β is estimated with the respective EPS change (horizon is equal to 3 months, 6 
months, 12 months and above 12 months) and controlling for changes in the Leading Economic Indicator
( leiD ), market excess returns (mex), dividend yield (divy), default spread (defs), term spread (tes), 3-month T-
Bill rate (3mtb), and three lags of the dependent variable. Inference is based on Newey-West Standard Errors. *, 
**, *** indicates significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. 
Control Model Control Model Control Model Control Model 
 
EPS 3 months EPS 6 months EPS 12 months EPS > 12 months 
Horizon 1b  1b  1b  1b  
1 0.0004 -0.0002 0.0003 0.0007 
2 0.0034 -0.0001 -0.0002 0.0000 
3 0.0054 0.0003 -0.0005 -0.0003 
4 0.0040 0.0003 -0.0005 -0.0002 
5 -0.0008 0.0004 -0.0007 -0.0006 
6 0.0001 0.0002 -0.0028 -0.0008 
7 -0.0044 0.0008 -0.0031 -0.0015 
8 0.0024 0.0005 -0.0028 -0.0007 
9 -0.0019 0.0006 -0.0003 -0.0014 
10 -0.0006 -0.0002 -0.0004 -0.0012 
11 -0.0048 -0.0002 0.0001 -0.0027 
12 0.0018 -0.0010 0.0011 -0.0031 
We do not find any predictive power for the CFNAI in companies’ aggregated earnings per 
share forecasts. This result is in line with the disadvantages of earnings forecasts discussed in 
Section 4.2. Most prominently, recommendations contain a larger information set than just an 
one period earnings forecasts. They basically include earnings forecasts for several years as 
well as interest rate assumptions and risk premium forecasts. Additionally, earnings forecasts 
might be based on stale information. Consequently, our results lend support to the notion that 
more forward-looking information, as included in recommendation changes, is required if one 
attempts to forecast future macroeconomic developments. 
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4.5 Conclusion 
Combining individual company outlooks and macroeconomic developments is a new 
approach to exploit publicly available, but neglected, information. Our results show that the 
aggregation of these outlooks has predictive power for future macroeconomic developments 
of about one year. Due to their strong performance, changing company outlooks might be a 
promising predictor for different applications, especially in the area of now-casting and mid-
term forecasting, e.g., for economic agencies. As shown, our measure contains information 
content not inherent in well-established macroeconomic predictors. Therefore it seems 
mandatory to use company outlooks as a control variable in models which could be 
influenced by macroeconomic developments. 
Our results also provide a potential explanation for the old Wall Street saying that the stock 
market leads the economy. Recommendation changes basically mirror expectation changes of 
well informed market participants. We document that these changes lead overall 
macroeconomic conditions. Assuming that the stock market incorporates these new 
expectations, the overall stock market must lead the real economy. Thus far there is no study 
showing this direct link. 
Furthermore, we provide further evidence that analysts provide a unique information set on 
financial markets and play an important role as financial intermediaries. Analysts implicitly or 
explicitly anticipate macroeconomic developments when processing information in their stock 
recommendations. Our findings therefore also support the theoretical notion that analysts play 
an important role as financial intermediaries on financial markets. 
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Appendix to Chapter 2 
Appendix 2 A: 
 
Definitions of the analyst and forecast characteristics: 
ACCURACYijt-1 - a measure of analyst i’s forecast accuracy for firm j in year t-1. It is 
calculated as the maximum absolute forecast error for analysts who follow firm j in year t-1 
minus the absolute forecast error of analyst i following firm j in year t-1, with this difference 
scaled by the range of absolute forecast errors for analysts following firm j in year t-1; 
BROKER_SIZEijt-1 - a measure of the analyst’s broker size. It is calculated as the number of 
analysts employed by the broker employing analyst i following firm j in year t-1 minus the 
minimum number of analysts employed by following firm j in year t-1, with this difference 
scaled by the range of brokerage size for analysts brokers for analysts following firm j in year 
t-1; 
FOR_FREQUENCYijt-1 - a measure of analyst i’s forecast frequency for firm j. It is calculated 
as the number of firm j forecasts made by analyst i following firm j in year t-1 minus the 
minimum number of firm j forecasts for analysts following firm j in year t-1, with this 
difference scaled by the range of number of firm j forecasts issued by analysts following firm 
j in year t-1; 
FIRM_EXPERIENCEijt-1 - a measure of analyst i’s firm-specific experience. It is calculated as 
the number of years of firm-specific experience for analyst i following firm j in year t-1 minus 
the minimum number of years of firm-specific experience for analysts following firm j in year 
t-1, with this difference scaled by the range of years of firms-specific experience for analysts 
following firm j in year t-1; 
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GEN_EXPERIENCEijt-1 - a measure of analyst i’s general experience, It is calculated as the 
number of years of experience for analyst i following firm j in year t-1 minus the minimum 
number of years of experience for analysts following firm j in year t-1, with this difference 
scaled by the range of years of experience for analysts following firm j in year t-1. 
COMPANIESijt-1 - a measure of the number of companies analyst i follows in year t-1. It is 
calculated as the number of companies followed by analyst i following firm j in year t-1 
minus the minimum number of companies followed by analysts who follow firm j in year t-1, 
with this difference scaled by the range in the number of companies followed by analysts 
following firm j in year t-1; 
INDUSTRIESijt-1 - a measure of the number of industries analyst i follows in year t-1. It is 
calculated as the number of industries covered by analyst i following firm j in year t-1 minus 
the minimum number of industries followed by analysts who follow firm j in year t-1, with 
this difference scaled by the range in the number of industries followed by analysts following 
firm j in year t-1.  
Boldijt - is a measure for the boldness of analyst i’s forecast for firm j in year t-1. It is 
calculated as the absolute distance of analyst’s i forecast from the 90 day consensus issued of 
all analysts following firm j in year t-1 minus the minimum absolute distance for analysts who 
follow firm j in year t-1, with this difference scaled by the range in absolute distances for 
analysts following firm j in year t-1. 
LAG_ACCURACYijt-1 - a measure of analyst i’s past forecast accuracy for firm j. It is 
calculated as the earnings accuracy for analyst i following firm j in year t – 1 minus the 
minimum earnings accuracy by analysts who followed firm j in year t-1, with this difference 
scaled by the range in the earnings accuracy for analysts following firm j in year t-1.  
105 
 
GEN_ACCURACYijt-1 - a measure of analyst i’s general past forecast accuracy for all firms j 
covered by this analyst. The general past forecast accuracy is calculated as the mean of all 
values for LAG_ACCURACYijt-1 by analyst i following firms j in year t – 1 minus the 
minimum general past forecast accuracy by analysts who followed firm j in year t-1, with this 
difference scaled by the range in the general past forecast accuracy for analysts following firm 
j in year t-1.  
DAYS_ELAPSEDijt-1 - a measure of the days elapsed since the last forecast by any analyst 
following firm j in year t-1. It is calculated as the days between analyst i’s forecast of firm j’s 
earnings in year t-1 and the most recent preceding forecast of firm j’s earnings by any analyst, 
minus the minimum number of days between two adjacent forecasts of firm j’s earnings by 
any two analysts in year t-1, with this difference scaled by the range of days between two 
adjacent forecasts of firm j’s earnings in year t-1; 
FOR_HORIZONijt-1 - a measure of the time from the forecast date to the end of the fiscal 
period. It is calculated as the forecast horizon (days from the forecast date to the fiscal year-
end) for analyst i following firm j in year t-1 minus the minimum forecast horizon for analysts 
who follow firm j in year t-1, with this difference scaled by the range of forecast horizons for 
analysts following firm j in t-1. 
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Table 2.8: Data Filters 
This table shows the filters used to obtain the sample along with the respective number of observations. Panel A 
shows the filters for the annual Earnings forecasts from I/B/E/S. Panel B shows the filters for the stock 
recommendations from I/B/E/S.  
Panel A: Earnings Forecasts # Obs.
  Annual earnings forecasts issued from 01/1993 to 12/2010 4,842,117
1 Firms that can be matched with CRSP 4,363,659
2 Analysts that do not remain anonymous in I/B/E/S 4,308,471
3 Forecasts until 1997 for primary earnings, from 1998 on for diluted earnings 4,002,822
4 Forecasts issued not more than two years before the report date 3,541,759
5 Forecasts with a price-scaled forecast error below 25% 3,488,074
6 At least two analysts issue forecasts for the firm-year 3,462,808
7 Forecasts which are the last earnings forecast by the analyst in the fiscal year  709,450
Panel B: Stock Recommendations 
Recommendations issued between 1/1994 to 12/2010 for U.S. Firms 524,059
8 Analysts that do not remain anonymous in I/B/E/S 507,596
9 Recommendations that are not issued with the same rating on the same day 506,882
for the same firm by the same analyst  
10 Recommendations that can be classified according to the accuracy model  331,121
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Appendix 4 A: Stationarity Tests of the CFNAI Change and its 
Components 
 
Table 4.6: Stationarity Tests of the CFNAI Change and its Components 
This table reports Phillips-Perron  testt - statistics using the corresponding MacKinnon approximated p-
values for the forward looking CFNAI change (CFNAI F), historical CFNAI changes (CFNAI H), and the 
changes of the respective CFNAI components Production and Income (PI), Employment, Unemployment, and 
Hours (EUH), Personal Consumption and Housing (CH), and Sales, Orders, and Inventories (SOI). *, **, ***
indicates significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. 
Horizon CFNAI F CFNAI H CFNAI PI CFNAI EUH CFNAI CH CFNAI SOI 
1 -12.601*** -12.601*** -13.499*** -11.267*** -10.983*** -16.450*** 
2 -6.178*** -6.178*** -7.146*** -5.325*** -5.618*** -7.614*** 
3 -5.922*** -5.922*** -6.921*** -5.586*** -5.535*** -7.785*** 
4 -4.786*** -4.786*** -5.282*** -4.736*** -4.684*** -6.454*** 
5 -4.597*** -4.597*** -5.227*** -4.620*** -4.450*** -5.760*** 
6 -4.266*** -4.266*** -5.047*** -4.195*** -4.084*** -5.953*** 
7 -3.948*** -3.948*** -4.611*** -3.952*** -3.711*** -5.167*** 
8 -3.447*** -3.447*** -4.247*** -3.662*** -3.411** -4.934*** 
9 -3.044** -3.044** -4.022*** -3.512*** -3.134** -4.677*** 
10 -2.663* -2.663* -4.044*** -3.379** -2.904*** -4.320*** 
11 -2.633* -2.633* -3.882*** -3.240** -2.648* -4.488*** 
12 -2.205 -2.205 -3.828*** -3.146** -2.477 -4.074*** 
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Table 4.7: Correlation Matrix 
This table reports the correlations coefficients between the 12 forward looking CFNAI changes (CFNAI1 to CFNAI12), the recommendation change (Δrec), the change in the 
Leading Economic Indicator (Δlei), market excess returns (mex), dividend yield (divy), default spread (defs), term spread (tes), and the 3-month T-Bill rate (3mtb). 
CFNAI 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 Δrec Δlei mex divy defs 3mtb tes 
CFNAI1 1.00                                     
CFNAI2 0.72 1.00 
CFNAI3 0.65 0.85 1.00 
CFNAI4 0.45 0.72 0.88 1.00 
CFNAI5 0.44 0.59 0.78 0.91 1.00 
CFNAI6 0.39 0.55 0.67 0.83 0.93 1.00 
CFNAI7 0.35 0.50 0.63 0.73 0.86 0.94 1.00 
CFNAI8 0.27 0.43 0.56 0.68 0.77 0.87 0.94 1.00 
CFNAI9 0.23 0.34 0.49 0.60 0.71 0.79 0.89 0.95 1.00 
CFNAI10 0.22 0.31 0.42 0.54 0.65 0.74 0.81 0.90 0.95 1.00 
CFNAI11 0.20 0.29 0.39 0.48 0.59 0.69 0.77 0.83 0.91 0.96 1.00 
CFNAI12 0.19 0.28 0.37 0.45 0.54 0.64 0.72 0.79 0.85 0.92 0.96 1.00 
Δrec 0.22 0.20 0.13 0.07 0.08 0.08 0.09 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.07 0.04 1.00 
Δlei 0.32 0.48 0.34 0.31 0.22 0.23 0.21 0.19 0.14 0.12 0.08 0.08 0.08 1.00 
mex 0.16 0.23 0.34 0.30 0.21 0.12 0.10 0.10 0.05 0.02 -0.02 -0.03 -0.12 0.28 1.00 
divy -0.08 -0.10 -0.07 -0.01 0.06 0.11 0.14 0.17 0.20 0.22 0.24 0.26 0.01 -0.15 -0.08 1.00 
defs -0.08 -0.07 -0.01 0.07 0.15 0.22 0.26 0.31 0.36 0.41 0.44 0.47 -0.08 -0.20 -0.27 0.17 1.00 
3mtb -0.04 -0.07 -0.10 -0.14 -0.17 -0.20 -0.22 -0.25 -0.27 -0.29 -0.31 -0.33 0.03 -0.09 0.13 -0.15 -0.68 1.00 
tes 0.08 0.09 0.09 0.10 0.12 0.13 0.15 0.18 0.20 0.21 0.22 0.25 -0.01 0.25 -0.08 0.31 0.39 -0.76 1.00 
 
 
 
